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I. INTRODUCTION
The roots of the federal common law of nuisance can be found in two early
twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions. In these cases, the Supreme Court first
acknowledged the jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain cases brought by
states to abate pollution arising in a neighboring state. In Missouri v. Illinois1 and
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 2 the Court enunciated that a sovereign possesses a
right to protect its ecological resources from unreasonable interference by another
state or its citizens. 3 The "quasi-sovereign ' 4 right to be free from external environ-
mental impairment required the judiciary to fashion a federal common law5 to resolve
interstate disputes6 and to implement national statutory policy, particularly when
natural resources were at issue.7
The nature of this right was described in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. as
follows:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its
territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on
its mountains ... should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control .... 8
A similar "fair and reasonable demand" prompted the Supreme Court, in
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1),9 to author a federal common law
governing interstate water pollution. In the same year that Milwaukee I was decided,
however, the Legislature also responded to the problem of water pollution. Congress
* As this note went to press the House and Senate adopted the Conference Report on H.R. 2867, "The Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984" and on November 9, 1984, President Reagan signed the amendments into law [15
Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1243 (Nov. 16, 1984); see infra note 161. The conference action and adoption
of the amendments does not materially affect this Note's analysis and the Conference Joint Explanatory Statement lends
support to the conclusion in part IV.
1. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
2. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
3. Id. at 238; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 (1906); see also New Jersey v. City of N.Y., 283 U.S. 473
(1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
4. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907), Justice Holmes described the interest each state
possesses, in its capacity as a "quasi-sovereign," in protecting the quality of its environment:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did
not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making
reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force
is a suit in this court.
5. See Ludington, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PosT-ERIE FEDERAL COMMON LAW, 31 L.Ed.2d 1006 annot.
6. Drafters of the Constitution anticipated interstate legal controversies and the subsequent federal interests
involved. THE FEDERAuISTNo. 80, at 476-79 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossitered. 1961). See generally Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1026-42 (1967).
7. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Hinderliderv. La Plata River& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92, 110 (1938); see, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95, 97-98 (1907).
8. 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
9. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (1972
Amendments), 10 a measure designed to monitor and control discharges of pollutants
into navigable waterways.
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee 11)" the Supreme Court ruled that
the legislature's enactment of the 1972 Amendments preempted federal common
law, 12 and that federal courts were barred from imposing stricter effluent discharge
standards than those established by Congress. 13 The Court appeared convinced that
the imposition of comprehensive regulations evidenced a congressional intent to
eliminate the application of federal common law. This preemption holding was
boldly reiterated in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association (Sea Clammers), 14 when the Court announced that no federal common
law of nuisance remained in the area of water pollution.' 5 Together, Milwaukee 11
and Sea Clammers have eliminated judge-made standards designed to control the
pollution of interstate and navigable waterways.
Past and current industrial toxic waste disposal practices present a resource
pollution problem similar to those addressed in the Milwaukee I and Milwaukee 11
decisions. The dangers posed by toxic substances have captured the nation's atten-
tion, and the past decade has witnessed an explosion of federal environmental laws
and regulations.1 6 Three of the most significant legislative programs designed to
regulate the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes are the Safe Drinking Water
Act of 1974 (SDWA), 17 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), 1 8 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).' 9
Unfortunately, current regulatory efforts will not quickly subdue today's per-
vasive threat of harmful toxic substance exposure. According to the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA's) most recent estimate, 71 billion gallons, or 290 million
metric tons, of toxic wastes are generated each year.20 In 1981, 14.7 billion gallons
of the waste were disposed of in and on land and approximately sixty percent of the
waste was injected into underground wells. Most of the remaining hazardous
substances were received by waste disposal sites either known to be leaking or
expected to leak in the future. 2 1 The best estimate of the number of uncontrolled
hazardous waste sites in the United States is about 15,000, and the best estimate of
sites that will not have any responsible or financially viable parties and are entirely
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175
(1970)) [hereinafter cited as the 1972 Amendments].
11. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
12. Id. at 314-15, 332.
13. Id. at 320.
14. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
15. Id. at 21-22.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 83-118.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
20. Shabecoff, U.S. Study Assesses Toxic Waste Woes, N.Y. Times, April 28, 1984, at 9, col. 6.
21. Id.; see also Shabecoff, Hazardous Waste Exceeds Estimates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1983, at t, col. 1.
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dependent on government money for cleanup is about 100 hazardous waste sites.
22
Additionally, as of yet no reliable data are available to help assess the environmental
threat presented by illegal toxic waste dumping.2'
The statutory law of toxic substances does not adequately protect the human and
natural resources threatened by hazardous waste released from these dumpsites.
24
Hazardous waste pollution controversies provoke the strong federal interest and the
compelling need for effective national policies that traditionally support the employ-
ment of federal common law, especially in interstate groundwater disputes. How-
ever, lower courts construing federal common-law nuisance claims in the hazardous
waste context have not reached this conclusion. To date, the two federal courts
directly confronted with the preemption question with regard to RCRA and CERCLA
have found the federal common law preempted.25 In United States v. Price26 the
government brought an action seeking injunctive relief to remedy the hazards posed
by chemical dumping that occurred at Price's Landfill in Pleasantville, New Jersey.
27
Water samples revealed significant contamination of the water drawn from wells
under the landfill as well as the water drawn from wells in the surrounding area. The
court found that the presence of any one of the many contaminants identified in the
groundwater surrounding Price's Landfill would present an extremely serious public
health problem. 28 In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co. 29 the City sought to
recover cleanup costs and the consequential damages that resulted from the de-
fendant's illegal dumping of industrial waste on city property. 30 The City alleged that
as a result of the illegal dumping, the soil at the site had been contaminated and the
adjacent Delaware River and groundwater underlying the site had been polluted.3 1
The plaintiffs in Price and Stepan each alleged several common law theories of
recovery, including the federal common law of nuisance, and both courts read
Milwaukee II as requiring the preemption of federal common law in hazardous waste
activities. 32 The district courts indicated that the "comprehensive nature of the
22. TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOus WASTE CONTROL, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 1, 30 (1983); [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1155 (Oct. 28, 1983).
23. [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1155, 1162 (Oct. 28, 1983).
24. See infra notes 268-301 and accompanying text.
25. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Price, 523 F.
Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affid, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
26. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (The district court ruling on the federal
common law issue was left intact by the Third Circuit.).
27. Id. at 1057.
28. Id. at 1063. The District Court of New Jersey denied the government's motion for injunctive relief to remedy the
dumpsite and also denied defendant's motion for summary judgment; plaintiff's claims brought under the federal common
law of nuisance were summarily dismissed. In the most recent ruling in the case, United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp.
1103 (D.N.J. 1983) (denial of summary judgment motion to second amended complaint), the court declared that "there is
no dispute that Price's Landfill requires immediate action," id. at 1113, and that "the danger which exists at Price's
Landfill ... only gets worse with the passage of time." Id. at 1117.
29. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
30. Id. at 1139.
31. Id.
32. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Price,
523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
schemes established by the RCRA and the CERCLA" 33 supported the inference that
Congress had fully occupied the hazardous waste disposal area so as to deny the
availability of federal common law nuisance remedies.
However, a federal common law of nuisance in toxic waste actions has not been
uniformly quashed. Courts have struggled with the jurisdictional and substantive
natures of section 700334 of RCRA and sections 106(a)35 and 10736 of CERCLA in
actions invoking these provisions. Specifically, decisions assessing the scope of
liability under these imminent hazard and liability provisions recognize a codified
federal common law of nuisance as the substantive basis of decision.
This Note analyzes the direct and indirect applications of the Milwaukee ll-Sea
Clammers preemption rulings in the context of hazardous waste pollution. Part II
examines the development of the federal common law of nuisance and its curtailment
and reviews: (1) Milwaukee I, Milwaukee II, and Sea Clammers; (2) the general
regulatory structure of RCRA, CERCLA, and SDWA; and (3) the analysis used in
Price, Stepan, and related decisions evaluating the federal common law of nuisance
in the hazardous waste area. Part III conducts a review of the preemption of federal
common law and seeks to distinguish the legislative responses to hazardous waste
pollution activities from the water pollution program deferred to in Milwaukee H.
This section's analysis highlights the factors that the majority in Milwaukee II
emphasized as significant in inferring a congressional intent to preempt the federal
common law of nuisance. Part III then examines subsequent mechanical applications
of these Milwaukee II "preemption standards" to hazardous waste regulatory
activities. Finally, part IV concludes that Congress intended to preserve and supple-
ment all remedies previously available to the public and to the government in order to
advance the overriding federal interest in a safe and healthy environment. Specific-
ally, Congress formally codified federal common-law principles in the imminent
hazard and liability provisions of the hazardous waste laws.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
While Erie R.R. v. Tompkins37 abolished general federal common law, the
Supreme Court expressly applied federal common law in a case decided on the same
day as Erie.38 The basis for applying federal common law rather than resorting to
state law stems from a judicially ascertained federal policy. Before rules of federal
common law are to be applied, a significant conflict between federal policy and the
33. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (quoting United States v.
Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981)).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
37. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Federal decisional laws have been
held to constitute "laws" within the meaning of the statute conferring federal question jurisdiction on the federal district
courts, Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 91 (1972), and within the meaning of the removal statute. Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). Federal common law also reigns supreme over state law. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333
U.S. 445, 450 (1948).
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use of a state's law must be specifically shown.3 9 Typically, federal common law is
applied to establish rules of law in areas which by their nature should be uniform
throughout the nation.4' This need for uniformity is the most frequently cited reason
for the fashioning of a federal common law.4 In developing a federal common law of
nuisance, the courts have been guided by common-law principles of public
nuisance.42 Under these principles, a nuisance is a substantial, unreasonable in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of land43 or with a right common to the general
public,' for which a public official may obtain relief.45
A unified theory of the federal common law of nuisance was first recognized in
1971 by the Tenth Circuit in Texas v. Pankey.46 In Pankey, the court declared that
since no applicable statutory remedy existed, an appropriate cause of action should be
made available under common law. 4 7 One year later, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(Milwaukee 1),48 the Supreme Court achieved the same result on essentially similar
grounds.
A. Milwaukee I, Milwaukee II, and Progeny-Preemption by Implication
1. Milwaukee I
The United States Supreme Court declined to exercise original jurisdiction49
over Illinois' claim that the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin was discharging untreated
and inadequately treated sewage into Lake Michigan. 50 Instead, the Court held that
the attempt by a state to regulate municipalities of another state should first be heard
in federal district court and remanded the case for resolution as a federal common law
nuisance action. 5 1 Upon examination of the existing federal water pollution
statutes,52 the Court also decided that Illinois' claim fell within a gap in the federal
statutory scheme.5
3
39. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
40. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353-54 (1966).
41. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 381 (1969).
42. REsTA-TEMEr (SEcoNtD) OF TORTS § 203 (1964).
43. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed. 1971).
44. Id. § 88, at 585.
45. Private individuals may obtain damages or injunctive relief ifan injury different in kind from that suffered by the
general public can be demonstrated. Id. at 586; see also Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997
(1966).
46. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (Texas requested relief from agricultural pesticide runoff from New Mexico
farms.).
47. Id. at 241. Thus, while Texas could have brought the case in the Supreme Court by virtue of its status as a
sovereign, the district court had full authority to hear the case, not by virtue of the status of the parties but because of the
nature of the legal claims at bar.
48. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
49. Id. at 108.
50. Id. at 94.
51. Id. at 108.
52. Id. at 101-02. The Court identified six statutes through which Congress had asserted a federal interest in
interstate water quality.
53. Id. at 103. The environmental degradation of navigable interstate waters was an issue upon which federal
statutes or decisions were not conclusive.
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Thus, federal common law, as pronounced in Milwaukee I, ostensibly provided
states an effective avenue of redress for interstate water pollution disputes. The
Milwaukee I Court's final justification for applying federal common law was founded
upon congressional demonstration of a strong national interest in preserving the
nation's waterways. 54 The conclusion of the Court that a strong federal interest in the
purity of interstate waters existed was well supported by prior congressional activity
in the area of environmental legislation.
55
2. Milwaukee II
Several months after the Milwaukee I decision, Congress decided to require
permits for all discharges into the nation's waters and passed the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972 (1972 Amendments). 56 The
City of Milwaukee obtained the requisite permits, but suffered an adverse judgment
in a state court enforcement action for failing to comply with the permits' terms.
Meanwhile, Illinois had won a judgment against the City of Milwaukee in the
northern district of Illinois for an abatement of the pollution. The district court found
a nuisance under federal common law in the discharge of inadequately treated sewage
from petitioner's plants and in the discharge of sewer overflows. 57 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that the 1972 Amend-
ments had not preempted the federal common law of nuisance. 58 The court reversed
the effluent limitations on treated sewage imposed by the district court because they
were more stringent than those in the permits and applicable EPA regulations. The
Seventh Circuit upheld the lower court's order to eliminate all overflows and the
construction timetable designed to achieve this goal.59
In Milwaukee 1160 the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that
the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA had eliminated the need for a federal common
law of nuisance for interstate water pollution. 6 1 In the opinion for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist stated:
54. Id. at 101-03. Writing for the Milwaukee I Court, Justice Douglas stated that "where there is an overriding
federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we
have fashioned federal common law." Id. at 105 n.6.
55. For a complete directory of water pollution legislation prior to 1972, see HousE COMm. ON PUB. WORKS, 91ST
CONG., 2D SEss., LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (Comm. Print 1970).
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
57. Illinois ex. rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1973); see City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 311 (1981). The judgment required Milwaukee to meet a set timetable for fulfillment of the
permit's requirements. Id.
58. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1979).
59. Id. at 164. The court of appeals ruled that the 1972 Amendments had not preempted the federal common law of
nuisance, but that "[iln applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollution case, a court should not ignore
the Act but should look to its policies and principles for guidance." Id.
60. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
61. Id. at 314-26. Justice Rehnquist, writing on behalf of six members of the Court, referred to a passage in the
Milwaukee I opinion which noted that it may happen that "new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time
pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance." Id. at 314 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
107 (1972)).
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We conclude that, at least so far as concerns the claims of respondents, Congress has
not left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application
of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence,
but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory
program supervised by an expert administrative agency.
62
The Milwaukee II analysis discussed the implied congressional intent to preempt
federal common law,63 because neither the 1972 Amendments nor their legislative
history explicitly preempted alternative remedies. 64 The Court rejected the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that section 505(e), 65 the savings clause in the 1972 Amend-
ments, specifically preserved the federal common law remedy. Section 505(e) of the
Act reads: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Adminstrator or a State agency)." 66 Although a number of federal courts interpreted
section 505(e) as preserving federal common law, 67 the Court was skeptical that the
section 505(e) reference to "common law" included federal common law. Justice
Rehnquist concluded that Congress intended only to ensure that the availability of
citizen-originated suits would not revoke other state common law remedies.
68
However, the majority attributed critical significance to the section's phrase "nothing
in this section" and maintained that a literal reading of the statute did not affect their
judgment that the Act as a whole supplanted formerly available federal common
law. 69 Congress, the Court said, clearly preferred that water pollution be regulated
through a comprehensive administrative scheme rather than through the ad hoc
development of case law.70 The Court established the following test for resolving
such preemption issues: "[T]he question whether a previously available federal
common-law action has been displaced by federal statutory law involves an assess-
ment of the scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress
addresses the problem formerly governed by federal common law." 7 1 Applying this
62. 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
63. See id. at 311-24.
64. The Court also interpreted § 510 of the 1972 Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982), which expressly
authorizes the adoption of more stringent effluent standards, to mean only that states may legislate stricter standards with
regard to intrastate polluters and that these standards are invalid as applied to interstate disputes. 451 U.S. 304, 327-28
(1981).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982). The majority in Milvaukee II noted that § 505(e) is "virtually identical to
subsections in the citizen-suit provisions of several environmental statutes," and proceeded to list the various saving
clause sections employing language similar to § 505(e). 451 U.S. 304, 328-29 & n.21.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982).
67. Justice Blackmun related that "[tlo the best of my knowledge, every federal court that has considered the issue
has concluded that, in enacting § 505(e), Congress meant to preserve federal as well as state common law." 451 U.S.
304, 340 & n.9 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Hayton, Groundwater Legal Regime asInstrument of Policy
Objectives and Management Requirements, 22 NAT. REsotRcEs J. 119, 134-35 (1982).
68. 451 U.S. 304, 328-29 (1981). Justice Blackmun, in referring to language used by the court of appeals in the
case, stated that: "there is nothing in the phrase 'any statute or common law' that suggests that this provision is limited to
state common law." Id. at 340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 328-29; see infra text accompanying notes 157-63.
70. 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
71. Id. at 315 n.8 (emphasis supplied).
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"test" in Milwaukee H, the Court noted that Congress considered the 1972 Amend-
ments to be a comprehensive regulatory program,7 2 that the program was to be
"supervised by an expert administrative agency," 73 that a permit was required to
discharge substances into the environment, and that the area covered by the program
was not suited for regulation by a judge-made common law. 74
3. Sea Clammers
By focusing entirely on Congress' intent regarding preemption and by refusing
to inquire into the need for federal common law, the Court in Milwaukee II disdained
the analysis employed in Milwaukee I regarding the need for a federal common law of
nuisance. 75 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association (Sea Clammers)76 the Court broadly applied its Milwaukee II preemption
holding. The plaintiffs alleged that discharges into the ocean were harming their
fishing grounds and sought both damages and injunctive relief under federal statutes
and the federal common law of nuisance. 77 The Court summarily dismissed the
federal common-law claim. In language that was arguably dictum, Justice Powell
wrote that the Milwaukee H Court had held the federal common law of nuisance in the
area of water pollution to be entirely preempted by the more comprehensive scope of
the FWPCA. 78 The Court found the relevant ocean-dumping provisions of the
Marine, Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA)79 to be nearly
identical to the FWPCA regulatory approach and that, consequently, "no cause for
[a] different treatment of the preemption question" existed. 80
Taken together, Milwaukee H and Sea Clammers could be interpreted as leaving
no room for common-law actions involving any category of environmental pollution
that has been addressed by "comprehensive" federal legislation. 81 Specifically, the
federal statutory framework for controlling hazardous wastes seemingly exhibits the
scope and characteristics described in the Milwaukee II test.82 As such, RCRA and
CERCLA have been interpreted to preempt a federal common law of nuisance.
72. Id. at 317.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 325.
75. The approach adopted by the Court in Milvaukee I has been described as "essentially an interests analysis that
balances federal and state interests in having their own laws apply to particular controversies." Bleiweiss, Environmental
Regulation and the Federal Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 HARv. ENv'L. L. REV.
41, 59 (1983).
76. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
77. Id. at 1, 4 & n.6. Plaintiffs successfully maintained the federal common-law claim in the court of appeals, which
held that private parties could sue under the common law of nuisance. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 616
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980).
78. 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981). The Court's comparison of MPRSA to FWPCA apparently only required that there
was "no cause for different treatment of the [ocean-dumping] pre-emption question." Id. at 22. The main issue in Sea
Clammers was not whether federal common law of nuisance existed but whether implied private rights of action were
available to private plaintiffs. Also, the Court reached its Sea Clammers decision without the assistance of briefing or
argument regarding the effect of Milwaukee H. In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized this narrow form of statutory
review: "The Court's ... approach ... is out of step with the Court's own history and tradition." 453 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1421 (1982).
80. 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981).
81. See Requiem for the Federal Common Law of Nuisance, 11 ErNvmt. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 10,191 (1981).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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B. Hazardous Waste Regulatory Programs: Federal Common Law of Nuisance is
Cut Off at the Pass
1. Background: Regulatory Framework and Provisions of the
Hazardous Substances Laws
The current status of federal common law as applied to hazardous waste disposal
rests on the interpretation of three federal statutes: the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 8 3 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA),84 and certain related provisions of the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA). 85 RCRA imposes an ambitious regulatory program
upon the transport, handling, and disposal of hazardous waste. CERCLA supple-
ments RCRA by authorizing state and federal governments to institute actions for
containment, cleanup, and removal of hazardous wastes. The SDWA requires the
EPA to prescribe state programs designed to prevent underground injections, includ-
ing those of hazardous wastes, which may endanger drinking water sources. A review
of the characteristics of the hazardous waste environmental problems and of the
corresponding regulatory responses affords the necessary background for analysis of
the lower court interpretations.
a. RCRA
Faced with the environmental "time-bomb" of hazardous wastes, 86 Congress
began the process of legislating protective measures. The 1976 enactment of RCRA
required the EPA to establish a comprehensive program regulating hazardous waste
from "cradle-to-grave." 87 The statute was designed to control the "treatment,
storage, transportation, and disposal of hazardous wastes which have adverse effects
on health and the environment." 88 Subtitle C commanded the EPA to identify and list
hazardous wastes, 89 and then to establish standards governing generators, 9 °
transporters, 91 and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and disposal
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300i to 300j-10 (1982).
86. The EPA's inventory of uncontrolled sites has swelled to more than 15,000 "and the total is increasing
steadily." TECtINOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AssEssMiENTr SUMMARY 30 (1983).
87. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6949 (1982); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262-267 (1983). Congress had
demonstrated a concern for the problems caused by the disposal of hazardous waste by adopting the Solid Waste Disposal
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965), and the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84
Stat. 1227 (1970), which have been superseded by RCRA. The Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1982), addresses disposal problems posed by toxic chemicals and provides relief in cases involving disposal of "an
imminently hazardous chemical substance." Id. § 2606(a).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(4) (1982).
89. Id. § 6921.
90. Id. § 6922.
91. Id. § 6923.
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facilities. 92 RCRA required the EPA to promulgate regulations requiring permits for
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 93 The Act also author-
ized the EPA to delegate to states the responsibility for implementing the regulatory
program.
94
Subtitle G of RCRA includes section 7003, which authorizes the EPA to quickly
abate hazardous waste pollution presenting an "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment."- 95 Section 7003 mirrors imminent hazard
provisions in previously enacted federal pollution control statutes.
96
The complex regulatory structure envisioned by Congress has not yet been
established.97 All the major regulations were issued behind schedule. Moreover, the
most important facet of RCRA, the core Subtitle C regulatory program, was not in
place until July 1982.98 Years after the enactment of RCRA, owners and operators of
hazardous waste facilities were subject to limited or no federal regulation. Further-
more, a serious gap in the regulatory framework existed because inactive and
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites 99 received no specific consideration in
RCRA. Congress failed to anticipate the magnitude of the problem created by prior
reckless and improper hazardous waste disposal practices, and threats to the environ-
ment engendered by existing dormant sites remained. 1° °
b. CERCLA
On December 11, 1980, after extensive hearings and some last minute amend-
ments, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA)'0° to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup,
92. Id. § 6924.
93. Id. § 6925.
94. Id. § 6926. As of November 19, 1980, anyone "owning or operating a facility for the treatment, storage, or
disposal of hazardous wastes" must obtain operating permits from the EPA. The formal procedure for notifying the EPA
of hazardous waste activities and for applying for permits is set out at 45 Fed. Reg. 12,746 (1980) and 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.4, 122.22, 122.24 (1983).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982).
96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1982) (The Safe Drinking Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982) (The Clean
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982) (The Clean Air Act); see also Skaff, The Emergency Powers in the Environmental
Protection Statutes: A Suggestion for a Unified Emergency Provision, 3 HARv. ENVrL. L. Rev. 298, 302-03 (1979);
Using RCRA's Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9 ECoLOGY L.Q. 599, 604 (1981); infra
notes 344, 351.
97. The federal standards and permit program were to have been published in the Federal Register in April 1978.
The first major component of the regulations did not appear until February 26, 1980, followed three months later by a
second set of rules. See infra text accompanying notes 235-62; see also Comment, EPA Issues RCRA's "Cradle-ro-
Grave" Hazardous Waste Rules, 10 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENv'L. L. INST.) 10,130 (1980).
98. See Broram, EPA's New Land Disposal Standards, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvrt.. L. INST.) 15,027 (1982).
99. The distinction between abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites lies in the continuing ownership of the
latter. A dumpsite has been abandoned when its owners and operators no longer maintain a relationship with it. A site
which the current owner controlled while it was used for waste disposal is an inactive site.
100. Gulick, Superfund: Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGy L.Q. 524, 538
(1981); Comment, Hazardous Waste Liability and Compensation: Old Solutions, New Solutions, No Solutions. 14 CONN.
L. REv. 307, 316 (1982).
101. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982)).
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and emergency response to hazardous substances released into the environment. 102
CERCLA authorizes state and federal governments to institute actions against
responsible parties for the containment, cleanup, and removal of hazardous
wastes. 10 3 The Act also creates a Hazardous Substances Response Fund or "Super-
fund," jointly financed by industry and the federal government.'" The fund is
available to allow the government compensation for efforts undertaken to contain,
cleanup, and remove hazardous wastes if the responsible parties cannot be located or
are unable to undertake such activities in a quick and cost-effective manner.'
0 5
Section 107106 of the Act imposes strict liability for government response costs and
damages to natural resources onto responsible parties, subject to specified dollar
limits and certain enumerated defenses.' 0 7 The statute also contains section 106, a
provision that authorizes judicial action when an imminent and substantial threat to
the public health and welfare or to the environment is caused by actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance.' 0 8 Finally, CERCLA requires that a revised
"National Contingency Plan" be prepared to reflect and carry out the responsibilities
and powers created by the Act.' 0 9
c. SDWA
The Safe Drinking Water Act'10 established a regulatory program designed to
protect the quality of publicly supplied drinking water in the United States. Part C of
the Act mandates regulation of underground injection of fluids through wells, 1 '" and
requires either individual states or the EPA to administer Underground Injection
Control (UIC) programs." 2 No injection is allowed that would endanger "drinking
water sources;"' 13 an injection is proscribed if it may result in the presence of a
102. Congress, in a description of the necessity for CERCLA, specifically found that "[e]xisting law is clearly
inadequate to deal with this massive problem [of inactive hazardous waste sites] ... [and therefore] the need for a strong
legislative response is evident." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6119, 6120 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1016].
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
104. Id. §§ 9631-9641.
105. Id. §§ 9611-9612; see also H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 102.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1982).
107. Id. § 9607(b)(l)-(4); see infra note 351 and accompanying text.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). The imminent hazard provision of Superfund provides in part:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the President determines that
there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney
General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the
district court of the United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such
relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require.
109. Id. §§ 9605, 9607(a)(4)(B); see infra note 300.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-l0 (1982).
111. Id. § 300h. Regulations for the program are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1-.55, 146 (1983). Underground
injection, "the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection," 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)(d)(l) (1982), is a relatively
inexpensive and potentially widespread hazardous waste disposal practice that can pose serious threats to groundwater
sources of drinking water. See Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to
Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARv. ENmrL. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1979).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-I (1982). SDWA provides for states to apply and receive approval for their own UIC
programs if they meet EPA minimum requirements. If a state fails to adopt or adequately enforce an approved UIC
program the EPA must install its own federally administered program.
113. Id. § 300h(b)(l).
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contaminant in underground water that supplies or can reasonably be expected to
supply any public water system." 4 The EPA has developed a classification scheme
that assigns active injection wells to one of five categories, according to the
substances injected into the well and its proximity to a drinking water source.1 15 By
definition, Class IV wells inject hazardous waste into or above Underground Sources
of Drinking Water (USDWs) 116 that contain drinking water sources within one-
quarter of a mile. 117 Recent amendments to the underground injection well regula-
tions promulgated by the EPA prohibit the construction, operation, or maintenance of
any hazardous waste injection, unless the well can qualify for one of several
exceptions to the prohibition. 11 8
2. Lower Court Developments
Milwaukee H has been heralded as signaling the demise of federal common
law. 119 Despite the extensive criticism that has been levied against Milwaukee II and
its broad preemption reading in Sea Clammers,120 lower courts seem inclined to
broadly apply the preemption doctrine. In response to the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Milwaukee I and Sea Clammers, several courts have dismissed federal
common-law nuisance claims brought under the FWPCA. 121 These rulings follow the
observation of Justice Stevens in Sea Clammers that the FWPCA has entirely
preempted federal common nuisance law in the area of water pollution. 122 Courts
have nervously begun to examine whether other federal statutes are likewise suf-
ficiently "comprehensive" to supplant the common law.1
2 3
The following sections examine the mixed bag of judicial activities defining the
existence and contours of a federal common law governing hazardous waste disposal.
An increasing number of lower courts are addressing the effect of RCRA and
114. Id. § 300h(d)(2). The contamination must degrade the water system such that either a violation of national
primary drinking water standards or adverse health effects may be expected.
115. The classification scheme is described at 40 C.F.R. § 146.5 (1983).
116. The definition of Underground Source of Drinking Water (USDW) is supplied at 40 C.F.R. § 146.3 (1983).
The EPA's Response to Comments about General Program Elements, which prefaces the promulgation of final rules
prescribing UIC programs, includes in the "E. Class IV Ban" section the statement that "the Agency [decided] to adopt a
very broad definition of USDWs [Underground Source of Drinking Water]. This broad definition ensures that any aquifer
even potentially useable as drinking water will be considered a USDW .... 49 Fed. Reg. 20,138, 20,141 (1984)
(emphasis added).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6(d) (1983).
118. Amendments to the Underground Injection Control Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,138, 20,141 (1984) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.13, 144.23).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
120. See, e.g., Note, Preemption of Federal Common Law-City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 31 DE PAut. L. REv.
201 (1981).
121. See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664
F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981); Chicago Park Dist. v. Sanitary Dist., 530 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Il. 1981); Love v. New York
State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
122. 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981). But see Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93 Orig. (U.S.filed May 24, 1982, leave to file
bill of complaint dismissed, Aug. 7, 1983) (Petitioner's claim relied on the continuing availability of federal nuisance law
in the interstate water pollution context.).
123. At least three courts have held that the Clean Air Act may operate to preclude federal common-law nuisance
actions. See New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981); Connecticut v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
535 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982).
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CERCLA on federal common law. District courts have ruled that the two Acts,
because of their comprehensive natures, occupy the field of hazardous waste disposal
and therefore preclude federal common-law nuisance claims. Courts entertaining
various other claims arising under RCRA and CERCLA have also adopted the
conclusion that federal common-law nuisance actions are not available in hazardous
waste litigation. However, the courts have exhibited divergent approaches to ques-
tions concerning the availability of a federal common law of liability as preserved by
specific provisions in the two Acts.
a. Federal Common-Law Nuisance Claims
At least two courts to date have applied the Milwaukee II ruling and dismissed
claims founded upon the federal common law of nuisance, finding the claims
preempted by federal hazardous waste legislative action. 124 In United States v. Price
the United States brought an action seeking injunctive relief from the hazards posed
by chemical dumping.125 The lawsuit was brought pursuant to section 1431126 of the
SDWA and section 7003127 of RCRA, and included a claim arising under the federal
common law of nuisance.12 8 District Judge Brotman observed that the claim did not
present a "proper area for the development of federal common law' 129 because the
intrastate pollution at issue "neither require[d] a uniform federal rule of decision nor
implicate[d] important federalism concerns." 30 The court also ruled that even if
federal common law were available, it would have been preempted by the enactment
of RCRA and CERCLA.131 The court relied on Milwaukee II and concluded that the
scope of federal court lawmaking authority is limited when Congress has articulated
the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law. 132 Citing Sea
Clammers, Judge Brotman briefly concluded that "[t]he comprehensive nature of the
schemes established by RCRA and the CERCLA requires us to conclude that, if
federal common law ever governed this type of activity, it has since been preempted
124. Another case dismissing a federal common-law nuisance claim for injunctive relief from hazardous waste
disposal, United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 12 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 20,819 (N.D. Ohio 1981),
did not reach the issue whether federal common law of nuisance has been preempted by the federal statutes. The court
dismissed the claim for plaintiff's failure to allege interstate effects of the pollution. See infra text accompanying notes
318-23.
125. 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D.N.J. 1981).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 300i (1982).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982).
128. 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D.N.J. 1981).
129. Id. at 1069.
130. Id. Included in the court's findings of fact was a determination that the intrastate pollution included private
wells in the area contaminated or likely to be contaminated. Wells producing an average of 41% of Atlantic City's daily
water consumption were also found to be in imminent danger of serious contamination. Id. at 1065-66.
131. Id. at 1069.
132. Id. Courts have used this language to fashion a rebuttable presumption that federal statutes preempt federal
common law. See infra text accompanying notes 197-99.
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by those statutes."13 3 The district court consequently granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment with respect to the government's federal common-law claims. "
The second case to address the federal common-law preemption question in the
hazardous waste area was City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.1 35 In Stepan,
the City of Philadelphia sought recovery for costs and damages resulting from illegal
industrial waste dumping on city property, alleging that the illegal dumping con-
taminated the soil at the city-owned landfill, the groundwater underlying the site, and
the adjacent Delaware River. 136
The City characterized its federal common-law nuisance claim as one for
interstate groundwater contamination, and argued that since neither Milwaukee II nor
Sea Clammers involved groundwater pollution, the claim did not require dis-
missal. 137 The district court accorded this distinction little merit and read the
complaint as being premised upon illegal disposal of hazardous waste.1 38 Judge
Ditter, although recognizing the availability of a federal common-law nuisance action
for the abatement of resulting hazardous conditions, 3 9 concluded that "Congress has
occupied the hazardous waste disposal area by virtue of two comprehensive enact-
ments" (RCRA and CERCLA). 140
In its opinion, the court reviewed the regulatory schemes established by
Congress:
Unquestionably, Congress has occupied the field of hazardous waste disposal. In the
RCRA it has comprehensively set forth the standards which are to govern every aspect of
this activity from generation to disposal. In CERCLA, it has established a system of
responding to releases or threatened releases from hazardous dumpsites, mandated the
adoption of an extensive plan to govern such responses, and imposed a standard of strict
liability on those parties involved in the disposal of hazardous waste.' 41
After quoting Price with approval, 142 Judge Ditter granted a motion for
judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants. 143
133. 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981).
134. Id. The government appealed the district court's denial of its application for preliminary injunction. The Third
Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court, commenting on the availability of equitable relief under the RCRA and
SDWA imminent hazard provisions. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1982). In its opinion, the court of
appeals did not comment on the district court's dismissal of the government's federal common-law nuisance claim.
135. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
136. Id. at 1139. The City of Philadelphia was forced to postpone the construction ofa sewage recycling center and
undertake a comprehensive cleanup program. The nine-count complaint sought recovery of 30 million dollars in damages
and civil penalties, claiming relief under CERCLA and the CWA, two Pennsylvania environmental statutes and various
Pennsylvania code provisions, state common law trespass and nuisance, and the federal common law of nuisance. Id. at
1139-40.
137. Id. at 1147.
138. Id.
139. The Stepan opinion noted the result in United States v. Solvent Recovery Servs., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn.
1980), in which the court allowed a federal common-law nuisance claim for contamination of groundwater resulting from
illegal dumping of hazardous waste. 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147 n.23 (E.D. Pa. 1982). However, the Solvent decision was
handed down prior to the Milwaukee 1 ruling and relied heavily on the availability of federal common law as supported in
Milwaukee I. United States v. Solvent Recovery Servs., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (D. Conn. 1980).
140. 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
141. Id. at 1148.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Although no other court to date has ruled on a motion to dismiss a claim
premised on the federal common law of nuisance, several opinions have accepted the
application of Milwaukee II in the context of hazardous waste disputes. In a
preliminary ruling, the court in United States v. Outboard Marine Corp. " denied
defendant's motion to dismiss a government action brought under the CERCLA
imminent hazard provision. The EPA sought injunctive relief from alleged releases of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into navigable waters.1 45 In determining the reach
of section 106(a)," the court refused to rely "on 'the public interest and the equities
of the case."' The court explained that "[r]ecourse to the federal common law of
nuisance seems to be foreclosed by Milwaukee //."147
Two other district courts have openly declared their acceptance of the Price and
Stepan rulings. In United States v. Waste Industries 48 the EPA filed suit seeking
injunctive relief to protect various water resources from toxic contaminants leaching
from an abandoned inactive waste disposal site. 49 In dicta, the court analyzed
whether substantive standards of decision under section 7003150 could issue from the
federal common law of nuisance, and determined that "[a]pplication of the Mil-
waukee II standard leads this court to conclude that the RCRA has preempted the
federal common law of nuisance in the area of hazardous waste management."' 15 1
Similarly, in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Co.152 the court concluded in a footnote that the federal common law governing
hazardous waste activities, because preempted by the relevant statutes, could not
provide authority for defendant's liability. 153
b. Congressional Intent to Preserve Federal Common Law
Conspicuous because of its absence from the Price and Stepan opinions is an
analysis of express congressional intent vis-a-vis the preemption of federal common-
law remedies. Judge Brotman correctly interpreted Milwaukee 11 as requiring def-
erence to federal legislation that articulates the standards to be applied as a matter of
144. 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
145. Id.; see Oklahoma v. Arkansas, supra note 122.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
147. 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. III. 1982). It is unclear whether the court's reference to Milwaukee 11 related to the
federal common law of nuisance as pertaining to navigable waters, federal common law of nuisance as regards hazardous
substances, or federal common law of nuisance in any environmental context. The passage invoking Milwaukee I1's
preemption ruling appears in the section of the opinion addressing the source of substantive law to be applied in a
CERCLA § 106(a) action, implying that the court believes that the federal common law of nuisance in CERCLA-type
hazardous substance actions is preempted.
148. 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982), rev'd, United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). The
decision of the Court of Appeals is reviewed infra notes 337-52.
149. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1302-03 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). The interpretation and application of the RCRA and CERCLA imminent hazard
provisions are briefly reviewed infra notes 344, 351 and accompanying text.
151. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1315-16 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (footnote omitted). The magistrate in the case had recom-
mended application of the common law of nuisance in the government's action. The court noted that the magistrate's
decision was rendered prior to Milwaukee 11. Id. at 1315 n.27.
152. 579 F. Supp. 823 (w.D. Mo. 1984).
153. Id. at 837-38 n.13.
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federal law. 154 However, the conclusion reached in Price, that Congress implicitly
intended the RCRA and CERCLA programs to preempt the development of a federal
common law of hazardous waste pollution, is incorrect if Congress expressly
preserved the use of federal common law. The terms of a statute explictly preserving
or preempting judge-made law should be controlling, as should clear evidence of
congressional intent to achieve such results. 155 As one commentator has explained:
[O]nce a court determines that Congress has expressed its intent regarding the use of
federal common law, that intent controls and all inquiry ends.
... [A] court should look for either an express savings or preemption provision in
the statute or express and uncontroverted evidence of preemptive intent in the legislative
history. 5
6
Implying congressional intent is unnecessary if express statutory language
preserves the federal common law. The savings clause in RCRAI5 7 contains language
substantially identical to section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act (CWA). 15 8 The
Supreme Court disagreed that the CWA savings clause preserved federal common-
law actions, reading the provision to mean that the authorization of citizen-suits does
not revoke other remedies. 159 Particularly, the majority pointedly responded to
Justice Blackmun's criticism:
[T]he dissent, in relying on section 505(e) as evidence of Congress' intent to preserve the
federal common-law nuisance remedy, must read "nothing in this section" to mean
"nothing in this Act." We prefer to read the statute as written. Congress knows how to
say "nothing in this Act" when it means to.
t
16
The Court's recognition of the dissent's position that Congress may have
intended to say "nothing in this Act" is noteworthy. While section 7002(f) of RCRA
tracks the FWPCA citizen-suit provision and reads "nothing in this section,"' 61
Congress broadened the language of CERCLA's savings clause to provide that
nothing in the entire Act preempts state or federal laws:
154. See supra text accompanying notes 125-34.
155. In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 339 (2d Cir. 1981).
156. Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of
Preemption, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 41, 60 (1983).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1982):
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating to the management of solid
waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency).
See infra note 161.
158. See supra text accompanying note 66.
159. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327-29 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
160. 451 U.S. 304, 329 n.22 (emphasis supplied) (citing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 114(a), 94 Stat. 2795 (1980)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9614
(1982)). The section cited by the Court, entitled "Relationship to other law," provides that "Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed or interpreted as preempting any state from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to
the release of hazardous substances within such state." The words "this chapter" originally appeared as "this Act" in
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (CERCLA).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(") (1982). "As stated in the Committee report which accompanied RCRA: 'Subsection (0
preserves any rights that a party to litigation would have under any other statutes or common law to seek the enforcement
of any standard or requirement relating to the management of discarded materials.'" HAzAtDous WAsTE COrroL AND
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Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of
any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to
releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants. The provisions of
this chapter shall not be considered, interpreted, or construed in any way as reflecting a
determination in part or whole of policy regarding the inapplicability of strict liability. 62
Justice Rehnquist's pointed reference to the CERCLA statutory language un-
derscores that, reading "the statute as written," section 302(d) of CERCLA is
evidence of Congress' intent to preserve the federal common-law remedy.
The distinction between the savings clause in CERCLA and that in the FWPCA
manifests the desire of Congress to save other remedies for hazardous waste
pollution. This distinction was not mentioned in either Price or Stepan. This omission
in each court's analysis is particularly troublesome. The marked difference in
statutory language renders the Supreme Court's determination that subsection 505(e)
'most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant
formerly available federal common-law actions ' 163 inapplicable to CERCLA.
The unique interpretation given to the savings clause of the CWA would apply to
section 7002(f), the similar RCRA savings clause.' 64 Section 7002(f), unlike the
savings clause in CERCLA, could not be relied upon to exhibit express congressional
desire to preserve federal common-law remedies. Assuming the scope and nature of
RCRA implicitly betray congressional intent to displace a federal common-law
approach, this preemption would extend to government regulation of the transport,
handling, and disposal of hazardous waste occurring after RCRA's effective date. 165
Enforcement Act of 1983, H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 49 (1983) [hereinafter cited as RCRA
Reauthorization].
The House of Representatives passed a bill reauthorizing RCRA on November 3, 1983. 129 CoNo. REc. H9133-84
(daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983). Section 1 (c) of H.R. 2867, entitled "Preservation of Other Rights," amended § 7002(0, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 to read "[Nlothing in this Act.'" RCRA Reauthorization, supra, at 49 (emphasis supplied). The committee
report on the RCRA bill explained the amendment:
[Slince the passage of RCRA, the Supreme Court overlooked language virtually identical to Section 7002(f) in
Section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act and held that Congress did not intend to preserve the federal common law
after passage of the Clean Water Act.... Therefore, the Committee has amended Section 7002(0 of RCRA to
read "Nothing in this Act" in order to continue to preserve the complete rights of litigants as intended by
Congress. This amendment is suggested by the Court as the appropriate manner to evidence such Congressional
intent.
Id.
The Senate Environment Committee reported a similar bill, S. 757, S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983),
that did not contain a provision similar to § 1 (c) of H.R. 2867. The Conference Report on H.R. 2867 Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,filed, 130 CoNo. REc. HI I, 103 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (to be reported H. REP. No.
98-1133 [hereinafter cited as Conference Report], failed to adopt the House amendment, explaining that "[flailure to
adopt the House amendment does not preclude the use of common law principles by the Federal courts in interpreting the
provisions (such as section 7003) of RCRA." Id. at H 11,125, 11,140 (Joint Explanatory Statement at the Committee of
Conference) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter cited as Joint Explanatory Statement]. The House and Senate agreed to the
Conference Report in the last days of the 98th Congress. Id. at H l,144; 130 CoNG. REc. S13823 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1984). President Reagan signed the amendments into law on Nov. 9, 1984. [15 Current Developments] ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1243 (Nov. 16, 1984). Of course, the failure to clarify a statute's language eight years after its passage is not
conclusive evidence of the Legislature's original intent.
162. Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 302, 94 Stat. 2808 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9652 (1982)). The phrase "this Act"
referred to in the text was changed in the codification process to "this chapter." See supra note 69.
163. 451 U.S. 304, 329 (1981).
164. The literal construction of § 505(e) was considered by Justice Blackmun to be an extremely strained reading of
the statutory language. 451 U.S. 304, 342 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent preferred construing the
reference to "this section" as simply preventing preexisting rights of action from being subjected to the procedural and
jurisdictional limitations imposed by § 505(e) on persons who would sue under the Act. Id.
165. RCRA was enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976).
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Arguably, the enactment of CERCLA provides only an additional set of statutory
remedies for the federal government, and section 302(d) does not revive any federal
common law already preempted by RCRA.
166
This narrow view of the intent expressed in CERCLA's savings clause can be
rejected on a number of grounds. First, hazardous waste problems unaddressed by
RCRA should be amenable to federal common-law solutions. Second, any hazardous
substance release related to activities occurring or concluding before RCRA's
effective date should arguably not be regulated under RCRA, 167 and therefore could
be a hazardous substance release to which CERCLA and its savings provision apply.
Finally, the availability of federal common-law remedies with respect to releases of
hazardous substances should also be unaffected, because preemption of federal
judicial powers over toxic waste disposal regulatory standards does not disturb
CERCLA's preservation of traditional equitable federal common-law nuisance
remedies. 168 Thus, the statutory remedies available under CERCLA are accompanied
by an express preservation of federal common law affecting the obligations or
liabilities of persons with respect to releases of hazardous substances. 169
However, the argument that CERCLA preserves only the federal common law
not preempted by RCRA contains a fundamental inconsistency. The analytical
neatness of a dissection between the RCRA and CERCLA "fields" of hazardous
waste regulation quickly blurs when the two statutes are examined together.
CERCLA was designed to close some of RCRA's regulatory gaps, and established a
response system to releases or threatened releases from hazardous dumpsites. The
Act also required reporting and recordkeeping for present and former hazardous
waste sites.17 ° CERCLA is primarily directed toward the cleanup of designated
inactive hazardous waste dumpsites. Nevertheless, the statute operates both to
supplement the RCRA regulatory approach and to provide a means of financing
responses to environmental hazardous waste threats. 17 1 CERCLA "picks up where
166. See Trauberman, Common Law Nuisance in Hazardous Waste Litigation: Has it Survived Milwaukee 11?, 13
ENVTL. L. RFp. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 10,043, 10,045 (1983).
167. Courts have divided with regard to the retroactive nature of RCRA's imminent hazard provision. See United
States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (Congress intended to apply the imminent hazard provisions to
disposals of hazardous waste that may present substantial endangerment.). But see Joint Explanatory Statement, supra
note 161, at H 11,137 (section 402 of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments clarifies that section 7003 of RCRA is
retroactive).
168. The facts and opinion of Milwaukee 11 support this observation. The Court rejected the imposition of standards
more stringent than those provided by the genuine effluent limitations developed by the EPA. The Court also pronounced
the lower court's application of nuisance and equity concepts inappropriate when imposed on a field already subject to
comprehensive administrative regulation. 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). Likewise, if RCRA results in a preemption similiar
to that in the 1972 Amendments, a federal court would be obligated to review the claims of hazardous waste litigants under
the standards articulated by Congress and refined by an expert administrative agency. A different result should obtain,
however, when claimants are demanding remedial action or relief from actions not subject to RCRA regulatory
provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 236-64, 282-96, 333.
169. See infra notes 344, 351, and accompanying text.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 101 -09; see also Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste
Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 268 (1981). Indeed, CERCLA was originally
proposed as a "multi-faceted federal regulatory scheme." Id. at 267.
171. See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 CoLUM. J. ENvT. L. 1 (1982).
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RCRA leaves off" and joins with RCRA "to form a sufficient authorization to begin
the cleanup of old hazardous waste sites." 17 The relationship between the CERCLA
and RCRA programs is such that neither statute is considered in isolation. 173 Recent
case developments confirm that suits of the type previously brought under RCRA's
imminent hazard provision now can be maintained under CERCLA's imminent
hazard provision.' 74 A narrow reading of the CERCLA savings clause, limiting the
section's preserving effect to common law not preempted by RCRA, emasculates the
legislative purpose enunciated in section 302(d).
Clear congressional intent to impose supplementary and complimentary liability
on enterprises releasing hazardous substances is further demonstrated in section
107(j). This section provides exemptions for various "federally-permitted releases,"
but states that:
Recovery by any person (including the United States or any State) for response costs or
damages resulting from a federally permitted release shall be pursuant to existing law in
lieu of this section. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liability of any person under any other provision of State or Federal law,
including common law, for damages, injury, or loss resulting from a release of any
hazardous substance or for removal or remedial action or the costs of removal or remedial
action of such hazardous substance.
175
This provision, read together with the expansively drafted savings clause, is a
clear expression of a congressional intent to preserve federal common law. 176 The
Price and Stepan courts completely disregarded these provisions with reference to the
federal common law of nuisance claims. Yet, each court relied on the unified,
comprehensive legislative approach as presented by the combined operation of the
two Acts to infer congressional intent to preempt federal common law.' 7 7 The
analysis utilized by each court encounters a fundamental dilemma. If Price and
Stepan rely upon the interaction of RCRA and CERCLA to establish Milwaukee
I-type "comprehensiveness," the courts cannot selectively ignore section 302(d),
section 107(j), and their preserving scope. Milwaukee H interpreted the CWA savings
clause to lack a declaration of congressional intent to preserve alternative federal
theories of recovery. An interpretation of the CERCLA savings clause produces the
opposite result, for the provision expressly provides that the Act as a whole will not
affect remedies under other federal or state law, including common law.
The Milwaukee IH Court was also skeptical that section 505(e)'s preservation of
"common law" included federal common law. The Court observed that, for the most
172. Id. at 2, 35-36.
173. See United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1316 (E.D.N.C. 1982) ("Because of the passage of
Superfund, this court need not consider a claim under section 7003 in isolation.").
174. See infra notes 344, 351 and accompanying text.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 96070) (1982).
176. See Bleiweiss, supra note 75, at 69; Collins, The Dilemma of the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of
Federal Common Law Nuisance, I 1 B.C. ENVTL. AFt'. L. Rev. 297,406 (1984); Trauberman, Common Law Nuisance in
Hazardous Waste Litigation: Has it Survived Milwaukee II?, 13 ENVrTL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 10,043, 10,045
(1983).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 87-109.
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part, the legislative activity producing the 1972 Amendments occurred prior to the
Milwaukee I decision.178 As such, the drafting of the Clean Water Act Amendments
presumably did not reflect the legislature's awareness of the federal common law. 179
No such skepticism can be directed to section 302(d), for CERCLA was drafted
against a decade-long history of unprecedented federal common-law development
and expansion.18 ° Furthermore, the legislative history reveals a significant con-
gressional awareness, throughout the drafting and compromise enactment process, of
federal common-law nuisance principles.'
8 1
The Price and Stepan courts failed to accord proper significance to the expansive
sweep of CERCLA's savings clause. As a result, their findings of preemption may
well misconstrue congressional intent. Given the courts' expressed concern with
congressional purpose, their disregard of express statutory language and failure to
investigate legislative intent are particularly troublesome.
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE AND THE Milwaukee II
PREEMPTION STANDARD
Since the Milwaukee I decision, lower courts have exhibited a general reluc-
tance to entertain traditional federal common-law nuisance claims that raise environ-
mental issues previously addressed by Congress. This reluctance to wield judicial
lawmaking power overcomes even clear legislative intent to preserve common law.
Furthermore, it appears likely that the federal courts will continue to apply mechani-
cally the broadest preemption rationale of Milwaukee 11.182
This trend is well documented in the hazardous waste context. Hazardous
substance disposal provisions are apparently similar in nature to the water pollution
statutes. The courts in Price, Stepan, and related cases relied on this apparent
similarity to follow the Milwaukee II lead and to infer a displacement of federal
common law.
The various lower courts appeared satisfied that the complex congressional
legislative enactments designed to address the dangers of hazardous waste disposal
met the Milwaukee I preemption test.183 In both Price and Stepan, the crucial inquiry
became whether or not the acts were sufficiently "comprehensive" to supplant the
178. 451 U.S. 304, 327 n.19 (1981).
179. Id. There seemed to be little reason for Congress to distinguish between the preservation of state versus federal
common-law damages. Justice Blackmun referred to the legislative history accompanying the 1972 legislation and
concluded that not only did Congress intend no distinction between the common law of the individual states and federal
common law, but it was specifically aware of the presence of federal common law. 451 U.S. 304,343 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
180. Yet the federal common law of nuisance "has [recently] undergone nothing short of revolutionary growth."
Federal Common Law of Nuisance Reaches New High Water Mark as Supreme Court Considers Illinois v. Milwaukee 11,
10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. lNsT.) 10,101 (1980).
181. See infra notes 336-51 and accompanying text.
182. Collins, supra note 176, at 406.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 124-53.
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common law.' 84 However, the inference drawn from the "comprehensiveness" of
the 1972 Amendments, that Congress intended its program to exclude all related
common-law development, was only one of several criteria the majority considered
in arriving at its preemption conclusion.
185
An application of a Milwaukee II "assessment"1 86 involves a scrutiny of all the
factors identified by the Court as significant. This scrutiny demonstrates that the
generalized analysis used by the two federal district courts does not support the
complete preemption of federal common law. Further, as will be shown in part IV,
these lower courts have ignored hazardous waste statutory policy by denying
appropriate federal common-law remedies expressly and implicitly preserved by
Congress.
A. The Comprehensiveness Factor and Implied Intent to Preempt General Federal
Common Law
The Court in Milwaukee II attached great significance to statements reported in
the statute's history revealing the legislature's perception of the Act as "com-
prehensive" and "all-encompassing.' ' 187 The Court interpreted these comments as
implying that the label "comprehensive" "strongly suggests" 188 an express resolve
to displace judicial activism and federal court lawmaking. 189
Similar language can be discovered in the legislative history of the hazardous
waste acts. In its report on RCRA, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce stated that "the approach taken by this legislation [RCRA] eliminates the
last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of
discarded materials and hazardous wastes," and that RCRA "addresses the problem
of the disposal of hazardous wastes in a comprehensive manner, including considera-
tion of the generation of hazardous wastes; the transportation; ... treatment; stor-
age; and disposal of such waste.' 90 In United States v. Waste Industries the court
directly referred to these pronouncements and concluded that Congress felt RCRA
joined previously enacted legislation to form a unified scheme of environmental
protection.' 9' Neither Price nor Stepan openly referred to this legislative "self-
184. 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982); 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981); see Requiem for the
Federal Common Law of Nuisance, II ENVT.. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 10,191, 10,195 (1981); see also Hinds,
Liability under Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1982).
185. 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981). Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he establishment of such
a self-consciously comprehensive program ... strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on
that program with federal common law." Id. at 319 (emphasis added). The Justice then turned to the facts relating to the
particular NPDES (National Permit Discharge Effluent System) permit that was before the Court and held specifically that
Congress had spoken the last word on the abatement of pollution from NPDES sources. Id. at 319-22.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
187. 451 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1981).
188. Id. at 319.
189. "The majority continually cites to the legislative record that the Act was intended to be a comprehensive
program for controlling water pollution as though the use of the word 'comprehensive' was indicative of congressional
intent to exclude all other attempts to abate water pollution." Collins, supra note 176, at 366.
190. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO. & Ao. NEws
6238, 6241-43, 6254 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 14911.
191. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1315 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
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consciousness" to support their rulings. Instead, both courts preferred to imply
congressional intent from the apparent comprehensiveness of the programs alone,
allowing the enactments to "speak for themselves" concerning a congressional
determination to preempt the hazardous waste area. 192
1. Criticism of the Comprehensiveness Standard
Reliance upon the facial appearance or Legislature's designation of a statute as
comprehensive is an unconvincing test for congressional intent. The majority opinion
in Milwaukee I ostensibly is not based upon constitutional principles delineated by
the Supreme Court, 19 3 but rather upon a controversial reading of congressional
intent. 194 A preemption of common-law remedies should not be compelled by the
unrelated observation that Congress has "spoken" to a problem area.' 95 Justice
Blackmun points out in his Milwaukee II dissent that the cases relied upon by the
majority support an accession to the particularized judgment of Congress only when
the Court "confronted a statute that had created a precise federal remedy where
before there had been none."
196
In its analysis, the Court implies that the precision of the legislative approach
will assume a significance in the preemption test. 197 Indeed, the majority opinion in
Milwaukee II makes a significant statement refining the applicability of the "com-
prehensiveness" test: "Since federal courts create federal common law only as a
necessary expedient when problems requiring federal answers are not addressed by
federal statutory law ... the comprehensive character of a federal statute is quite
relevant . ,,"9' While comprehensiveness is relevant, it should not be con-
trolling,9 9 particularly when a court decides that even within the context of a
192. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Price, 523
F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981).
193. 451 U.S. 304, 316 n.8 (1981).
194. See Hearings before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 572, 650-55 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 RCRA Hearings].
195. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42, 47; accord Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952);
see also [. TRIBE, AMEICAN Co NsTrrrrTONAL LAW §§ 2-1 to 2-4 (1978).
196. 451 U.S. 304, 338 n.7 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
197. But see Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982). The court analyzed the holdings in
Milwaukee H and Sea Clammers and concluded that the comprehensiveness test was appropriate and "not... the fact that
the amendments addressed some aspect of the problem in a particular way." Id. at 478. The opinion further established
that the question addressed by Congress was the entire question of water pollution and displacement was concomitantly
broad. Id.
198. 451 U.S. 304, 319 n.14 (1981).
199. Still, several courts have expansively interpreted the Milwaukee l--Sea Clammers comprehensiveness test. See
United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D.N.J. 1982) (concluding that since Congress had "addressed"
the problem of air pollution in the Clean Air Act, the statute preempts any federal common-law nuisance claims). But see
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Federal common law... is thus appropriate only
when a court is compelled to consider a federal question to which Congress has not provided an answer."). See also In re
Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981). In this action filed by the federal government to obtain cleanup costs
against parties charged with liability for oil spills, the Second Circuit determined that the claims based on federal common
law of nuisance were preempted by the 1972 Amendments. The court interpreted Milwaukee 11 to require a presumption of
legislative preemption of judge-made law. The court identified
19841 HAZARDOUS WASTE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW 813
complex regulatory scheme "problems requiring federal answers" are left without
remedies.2 "° In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham20° the Supreme Court elaborated
on this principle, indicating that "when [Congress] does speak directly to a question,
the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act
becomes meaningless."202
In Milwaukee IH the Court appears to have lowered its former standard of
statutory review. Milwaukee II's displacement of federal common law involved "an
assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by
Congress addresses the problem."" 3 However, this passage indicates that standing
alone, the preenactment characterization of legislation as "comprehensive" would
fail to supply the necessary information concerning the scope of the legislative
regulatory scheme actually established. Accordingly, congressional intent "to be
comprehensive," as reflected in the legislative histories and the detail of regulatory
programs, does not automatically translate into congressional intent "to displace"
federal common law.
A plausible argument can be made to distinguish the hazardous waste regulatory
programs from the 1972 Amendments analyzed in Milwaukee H and Sea Clammers.
Two positions can be advanced to discredit the Stepan and Price wholesale applica-
tion of the Milwaukee I comprehensiveness standard: first, that congressional
declarations of intent regarding the scope of RCRA and CERCLA are exceedingly
unreliable; and second, that any conjectural intent to provide an exhaustively
comprehensive regulatory scheme to address the hazardous waste problems has been
frustrated.
The legislative histories of RCRA and CERCLA are spotty, because both Acts
were rushed through Congress with little or no debate during a session's final
hours. 204 The confidence expressed in the contemporaneous legislative history of
RCRA that hazardous waste "loopholes" were being sealed was quickly shattered.
Subsequent to the passage of RCRA, Congress admitted that the Act was "clearly
factors . . . relevant to an assessment of whether the presumption of preemption has been over-
come . . . includ[ingl the scope of the preempting legislation, its detail and comprehensiveness, whether the
judge-made law is filling a gap in legislation or effectively rewriting the statute, and how well established the
judge-made law was at the time of the statute's passage.
Id. at 342-43.
200. The Court in Milwaukee 11 expressly narrowed its holding: as the reviewed discharge situation left no
"interstice" to be filled by federal common law, the preemption applied "at least so far as concerns the claims of
respondents." 451 U.S. 304, 317, 323 (1981). But see Collins, supra note 176, at 367-69 (discussing the inadequacies of
the CWA giving rise to Illinois' claim before the Supreme Court). This has provoked some questions, despite the Sea
Clammers dictum, concerning the scope of the FWPCA preemption effect. See Oklahoma v. Arkansas, No. 93 Orig.
(U.S. filed May 24, 1982, leave to file bill of complaint dismissed, Aug. 7, 1983) (Although Congress intended a
comprehensive scheme, the absence of phosphate and nutrient discharge regulation constitutes an actionable interstice.);
see also Comment, Federal Water Pollution Remedies: Non-Statutory Remedies are Eliminated, 17 LAND & WATER L.
R v. 105, 121 (1982) (Perhaps Milwaukee 11 does not entirely preempt the federal common law of nuisance in water
ollution.).
201. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
202. Id. at 625.
203. 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981) (emphasis added).
204. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 584-89 (1980) (discussions of Superfund's
gislative history); Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 253 (1981);
wvaks & Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
76, 3 COLUM. J. ErvL. L. 205, 218-20 (1977).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
inadequate to deal with [the] massive [inactive hazardous waste site] problem." 205
This admission demonstrates the amount of reliability to be accorded to the use of
optimistic descriptors by lawmakers. The legislative history of CERCLA is far less
illuminating; in the haste to draft the compromise piece of legislation, no committee
report was issued contemporaneous to the passage of the Act.20 6 Understandably,
courts forced to interpret and apply hazardous waste statutes have afforded less than
customary weight to the statements made by the Legislature.20 7
Read narrowly, Milwaukee II holds only that Congress intended the 1972
Amendments to provide exclusive federal control over activities regulated through
discharge permit programs. 2° 8 This interpretation suggests that distinctions can be
drawn based on the type of regulatory oversight that occurs and on whether the
environmental conflict concerns activities regulated in a fashion analogous to the
administrative program of the 1972 Amendments. 20 9 The Clean Air Act has been
distinguished from the Clean Water Act, in that a broad application of a Milwaukee II
preemption holding has been withheld from the Clean Air Act. 210 Like the CAA and
unlike the CWA, RCRA sets up a scheme that addresses some sources of pollution
and not others. 211 RCRA also represents the congressional desire to enter an area
traditionally within the sphere of local responsibility,21 2 in contrast to the "total
restructuring" and "complete rewriting" of the CWA considered in Milwaukee H1.213
As such, the hazardous waste legislation represents a fledgling approach as opposed
to the "fine-tuning" of a complex environmental problem.
It is interesting to note that Stepan and Price characterize RCRA and CERCLA
together as one comprehensive regulatory scheme from which congressional intent to
205. H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 102, at 6120.
206. See generally Grad, supra note 171.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 334-51.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 228-64.
209. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1312 (1982).
210. See New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981). In contrast to the IVPCA
requirements, "the states and the EPA are not required to control effluents from every source, but only from those sources
which are found by the states and the agency to threaten national ambient air quality standards." Id. at 32 n.2. In light of
those and other differences, the court left "for a more appropriate case the question of whether all federal common law
nuisance actions involving the emission of chemical pollutants into the air are precluded by the statutory scheme set forth
in the Clean Air Act." Id.
211. See United States v. Kin-Buc., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982). The district court rejected defendant's
argument that similarities between the Clean Air Act and the FWPCA logically require similar interpretation of the Acts
with regard to the federal common law of nuisance regarding air pollution:
ITihis reasoning ignores the differences between the two acts. While the FWPCA regulates every point source
of water pollution, the CAA regulates only those stationary sources of air pollution that are found to threaten
national ambient air quality standards. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that the CAA pre-empts the federal
common law of nuisance .... The CAA must be evaluated on its own terms.
Id. at 701. But see Pedersen, Jr., FederallState Relations in the Clean Air Act, the Clean l ater Act, and RCRA: Does the
Pattern Make Sense?, 12 ENVTL. L. Rat. (ENvL. L. INST.) 15,069, 15,070 (1982); see also City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981): "Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly
subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established by Congress to achieve its goals." (emphasis in
original).
212. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 190, at 6240; see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F
Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
213. 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
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preempt the federal common law of nuisance can be inferred. 21 4 This analysis lacks
doctrinal neatness. It is well established that "CERCLA was designed to fill in some
of RCRA's regulatory gaps." 215 Thus, congressional intent for RCRA to displace
federal common law of nuisance in 1976 must be inferred from the "comprehensive-
ness" achieved four years later in 1980 with the passage of CERCLA.2 16 This
illogical conclusion is further weakened by passages of legislative history suggesting
a congressional awareness that CERCLA would not provide a complete solution to
the problems of financing hazardous waste cleanup.217
The second objection to a general and broadly applied comprehensiveness
preemption standard is that any congressional attempt to provide a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to address hazardous waste problems has been frustrated. For
example, the first permits promulgated by the EPA under the auspices of RCRA went
into effect in 1980,2 8 and as of August 1982 the final regulations governing landfills
had not been promulgated. The regulations were long overdue and were not issued in
areas that would adequately protect public health and the environment. 21 9 In 1984,
142 of approximately 7,600 hazardous waste facilities targeted by the EPA for
permits had been granted final permits.2 2 °
Likewise, the CERCLA programs, as enacted and administered, do not reflect
the additional statutory authority that Congress originally fashioned to instigate
cleanup operations at existing hazardous waste sites. The concern for victim com-
pensation had long been documented by Congress; 22' regardless, the lame duck
session of the Legislature adopted a compromise Superfund law without a victim
compensation provision. 22 2 Final acceptance of the compromise bill was tenuous,
and to avoid the disintegration of earlier agreements the legislation was not resubmit-
ted for technical amendments.2 23 Thus, a number of significant features were
discarded and as enacted, CERCLA is a diminished piece of patchwork legislation.
Consequently, the CERCLA administrative structure is still embryonic in regard to
214. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v.
Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981).
215. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
216. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
217. See Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperaton or Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENvnt. L.
REv. 307, 321 (1983).
218. As of 1982 only two hazardous waste management facilities had received final approval. See 1982 RCRA
Hearings, supra note 194, at 23.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
220. [14 Current Developments] ENv'T. REP. (BNA) 2228, 2229 (April 13, 1984); see infra text accompanying
notes 234-46.
221. See generally S. ComM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS
WAsTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENTS OF LEGAL REMEDIES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION
301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIvE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, (P.L.
96-510) BY THE SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, S. REP. No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
222. See generally Grad, supra note 171.
223. See supra note 221.
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federal and state programs,224 and the EPA's ability to conduct operations and pursue
lawsuits against responsible parties has been seriously questioned.2 25
The rocky beginnings marking the nation's approach to toxic waste issues
characterize a congressional regulatory scheme that is not "universally" and "self-
consciously" comprehensive.22 6 The RCRA and CERCLA programs, while fairly
described as massive undertakings to enter the federal regulatory field, do not
represent an entire "occupation" of that field.227 Thus, the "comprehensiveness"
standard standing alone does not support the implication of a congressional resolve to
preempt the federal common law of nuisance.
2. Expert Administrative Agency Supervision and Implied Intent to
Preempt Federal Common Law
The second thrust of the Milwaukee 1I analysis of congressional intent revolved
around the EPA's authority to subject all dischargers to the established administrative
apparatus.2 2 8 The "assessment of the scope of the legislation" examined the extent to
which the administrative agency acted pursuant to its authority. 229 Milwaukee II
expounds upon the nature and detail of FWPCA controls and the extent to which they
subject water pollution problems to the expertise of administrative agencies. 230 In
determining that no interstice remained to be filled by federal common law, the Court
identified the factors it considered most probative of congressional intent to preempt:
[T]he state agency duly authorized by the EPA to issue... permits under the Act has
addressed the problem .... The agency imposed the conditions it considered best suited
to further the goals of the Act, and provided for detailed progress reports so that it could
continually monitor the situation. Enforcement action considered appropriate by the state
agency was brought, as contemplated by the Act, again specifically addressed to
the ... problem.
231
Specifically, the Milwaukee 1I Court found the intent to supplant federal
common law clearest when specific per-plant effluent limitations were established by
EPA regulations.2 32
224. [14 Current Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1155 (Oct. 28, 1983).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 234, 239; see also [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 977
(Oct. 14, 1983). Superfund is considered too small to clean up more than a fraction of the nation's abandoned sites.
William Hedeman, director of Superfund's implementation, admitted that "the resources of the fund simply are not
adequate to deal with the array of problems that exist." Mintz, A Response to Rogers, Three Years of Superfund, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) 10,036 (Feb. 1984) (footnote omitted).
226. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 n.12, 319 (1981).
227. See id. at 317.
228. Id. at 319-20.
229. Id. at 320-23.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 62, 73.
231. 451 U.S. 304, 322-23 (1981).
232. Id. at 319; see 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1983).
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a. The RCRA Permits Programs
Subtitle C of RCRA directs the EPA to promulgate regulations requiring permits
for hazardous waste facilities. 233 If "expert administrative agency" action under the
hazardous waste laws parallels in nature and detail the water pollution regulatory
oversight observed in Milwaukee II, the federal common law preemption holdings in
Price and Stepan are more justified. However, EPA attempts to "address the
problem" of hazardous waste do not comfortably survive a Milwaukee II "detailed
review" and fail to support a preemption intent.
The RCRA Hazardous Waste Permit Program, as designed, describes a full-
fledged, detailed schedule of regulations. However, the congressional mandate for
compliance by hazardous waste handlers has not been fulfilled by permitting
activities conducted by the EPA or by the authorized state agencies.
234
Initially, the permitting of RCRA facilities is considerably behind schedule. The
transfer to the states of authority over hazardous waste operations is underway. To
date, EPA has granted interim authorization 235 to forty-five states, 236 which eventual-
ly authorizes state agencies to grant permits for hazardous waste facilities. 237 The
EPA establishes annual target dates for permit issuance by the states, and available
data indicate that the agency confronts a significant permitting backlog. In fiscal year
1984, the EPA scheduled state agencies and agency regional offices to draft permits
for 434 storage facilities, forty-nine incineration facilities, and twenty-two disposal
facilities. A total of forty-seven RCRA permits were actually drafted in the first five
months of fiscal year 1984.238 Indeed, of the approximately 7,500 hazardous waste
facilities targetted for permitting, only 142 had been granted final permits as of
February 1984.239
233. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 264 (1983).
234. A general dissatisfaction with the status of RCRA administration and enforcement is capsulized in the
following statement delivered by Senator Gary Hart: "Unfortunately, because of internal disorganization, inadequate
budgetary resources, and an apparent policy of inaction, the EPA under this administration has reversed the slow progress
begun in the late 1970's. The EPA over the past 15 months has put a premium on deregulation .... 1982 RCRA
Hearings, supra note 194, at 25 (opening statement of Hon. Gary Hart, U.S. Senator from Colorado).
Hart's sentiment, expressed in 1982, is echoed in the report accompanying the House of Representatives RCRA
reauthorization bill, accompanying the House Res. 2867: the Committee on Energy and Commerce stresses its
dissatisfaction "with the pace projected by EPA to complete the permit review process for hazardous waste facilities." H.
R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1983). EPA's Fiscal Year 1985-86 Operating Guidance as approved by
Deputy Administrator Alvin Aim acknowledges that "compliance by the regulated community with the RCRA regulations
has been unsatisfactory." FiscAL YEAR 1985-86 OPERATNG GUMANCE, SUMMARY SECTIoN, [14 Current Developments]
ENV'T REP. (1NA) 2032 (March 9, 1984) [hereinafter cited as OPERATING GUIDANCE].
235. Interim authorization of state programs occurs in two phases. The first phase (Phase I) allows states to
administer a hazardous waste program which covers identification and listing of hazardous wastes, and establishes
preliminary (interim status) standards for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. The second phase
(Phase I) allows states to administer a permit program for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 40
C.F.R. § 271.121(b) (1983).
236. [15 Current Developments] ENv'r REP. (BNA) 397 (July 6, 1984).
237. See supra note 235.
238. States Must Triple RCRA Staffs to Handle Statutory DutiesAdequately, [14 Current Developments] ENV'T Ri,'.
(BNA) 2229 (April 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as States RCRA Survey]. According to the March 1984 EPA Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response Status report, two permits for incineration facilities and one permit for disposal
facilities were actually written in the five-month period. Id.
239. Id. John Skinner, EPA director of solid waste programs, told the Association of State and Territorial Solid
Waste Management Officials at the National Solid Waste Forum that "no progress is being made ... [n]ot even draft
permits have been on target." Id.
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The hazardous waste facilities not holding final permits are now governed by the
less stringent interim status RCRA regulations. 240 The EPA, in its official Fiscal Year
1985 Operating Guidance, has outlined a proposal designed to accelerate the
processing of final permit applications. Under the proposal, the agency will require
all facilities currently following interim status RCRA regulations to submit applica-
tions for final RCRA Part B permits by the end of fiscal year 1985.241 State agencies
are required either to issue or deny permits or issue closure notices for all land
disposal and incineration facilities by fiscal year 1988 and for all storage and
treatment facilities by 1990.242
The country thus faces a four to six year hiatus in which hazardous waste
facilities will be subject only to interim status guidelines, assuming that the proposed
timetable for final permitting is realistic and will achieve compliance. Also, until
permitting has been completed no assurance exists that "marginal" facilities unable
to comply with regulatory guidelines will be shut down. The EPA retains discretion
to require a facility owner at any time to file an application for a final permit. 243
However, the projected lengthy permitting schedule documents the overall antic-
ipated timetable for facility permit evaluations and decisions. It is also doubtful that
this EPA timetable is an accurate reflection of the RCRA compliance achievement
schedule. Some states have not yet been granted interim authorization to run their
entire programs, including the permitting of facilities. 2 " When interim authorization
expires for all states in 1985, only states with final authorization will be permitted to
240. 40 C.F.R. § 265 (1983). Section 3005(e) of RCRA provides for the continued operation of an existing facility
which meets certain conditions until final administrative disposition of the owner's and operator's permit application is
made. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982). See [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1942 (March 9, 1984).
Until November 1983, any person who owned or operated an existing Hazardous Waste Management Facility could
have interim status and be treated as having been issued a permit to the extent he or she complied as required with RCRA
§ 3010(a) and complied with the requirements governing submission of Part A applications. 40 C.F.R. § 270.70(a)
(1983). The EPA clarified the scope of the interim status standards for owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities in a final amendment to the standards. The final amendment imposes interim status
standards on all hazardous waste management facilities in existence on November 19, 1980, the date RCRA regulations
were issued. Hazardous waste management facilities operate under the interim status standards until EPA denies or issues
a final permit. 48 Fed. Reg. 52,718 (1983).
Section 7 of the House RCRA reauthorization bill (Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 1983, H.R.
2867, see supra note 161) had as its primary purpose the correction of deficiencies in interim status regulations. RCRA
Reauthorization, supra note 161, at 44. The Conference Report, supra note 161, at HI 1,134, retains most of this section's
provisions.
241. [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1942 (March 9, 1984). A RCRA permit application consists of
two parts, Part A and Part B. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.13-.29 (1983). For existing hazardous waste facilities, the
requirement to submit an application is satisfied by submitting only Part A of the permit application until the date the
Director sets for submitting Part B of the application. Id. § 270.1(b).
242. The EPA Draft Permitting strategy is reviewed at [15 Current Developments] ENV'T RE'. (BNA) 127-28 (May
25, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Draft Permit Policy]. The projected deadlines are in the draft policy set forth as part of the
EPA Fiscal Year 1985 Permitting Strategy to be issued in fiscal 1984. To accommodate state agencies in handling the
applications, the draft strategy envisions a one-year hiatus on calls for permit applications from over 3,700 hazardous
waste storage facilities until fiscal 1986 and 1987. States RCRA Survey, supra note 238, at 2229. The agency
acknowledged that the plan would slow other RCRA permitting activities but "by calling in land disposal and incinerator
permits first, we may initially issue fewer permits but expect to secure better results in protecting the environment."
OPERATING GUIDANCE, supra note 234, at 2034.
243. 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(e) (1983).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 235-37.
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implement their state hazardous waste plans in lieu of the federal program. 24 To the
extent that a number of states have yet to begin establishing administrative and
regulatory procedures designed to handle the processing of hazardous waste facility
permits, 46 these states are unlikely to meet the deadlines suggested by the EPA draft
proposal.
The nature of state programs operating under interim or final authorization is of
equal concern. The EPA may grant interim authorization only to states with programs
that are "substantially equivalent" to the federal program, 247 and final authorization
may be granted only to state programs "equivalent" to the federal program. 248 The
EPA has come under fire for granting Phase II and final authorization on the strength
of a state's promises in a Memorandum of Agreement to achieve equivalence. 249 It
seems likely that state programs without final regulations in place are also destined to
experience long permitting delays as the state agencies struggle to fulfill key federal
program requirements. Finally, if a state fails to fulfill the Memorandum of Agree-
ment, the EPA may be forced to revoke authorization and further disrupt the permit
process.2 50
Additional factors are critical to a feasibility assessment of the EPA draft
permitting strategy. As noted above, states are substantially behind schedule in
issuing permits for hazardous waste facilities. This backlog is due in large part to
inadequate funding and staffing at the state and federal level.Y15 State hazardous
waste administrators have criticized the expectations and goals established for the
RCRA program and have charged the EPA with failure to account for the limited
staffing levels and funds available to the states.2 5 2 Despite procedural and manage-
ment changes anticipated in the 1985 RCRA permit program, EPA permitting goals
will probably go unmetO53 unless increased funds are directed to state administra-
tions.
Fundamental shortages of funds and skilled personnel, as well as a lack of
administrative procedures designed to expedite hazardous waste permit application
processes, indicate that federal and state agencies lack the resources to provide the
detailed progress reports and monitoring activities extolled in Milwaukee H."5 4 State
245. 40 C.F.R. § 271.3 (1983). To date, only two states have received final authorization to operate statutory
hazardous waste programs under RCRA, and only ten states have submitted final applications for full authorization. [15
Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 397 (July 6, 1984). But see Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 161, at
H11,134 (interim authorization amended to expire on January 31, 1986).
246. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
247. 40 C.F.R. § 271.124(c) (1983).
248. Id.
249. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 501, 516-19 (1983) (prepared statement of Jane Bloom, attorney, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.); see 40 C.F.R. § 271.8 (1983).
250. 40 C.F.R. § 271.22-.23 (1983).
251. While the EPA increasingly has delegated responsibility for administering federal environmental programs to
state governments, federal funding for carrying out those programs was reduced between fiscal 1981 and fiscal 1983. Low
Level of Federal Funding Under State Grants Programs may be Eroding Past Environmental Progress, State Officials
Say, [14 Current Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 2296 (April 27, 1984).
252. Id.
253. OPEaa'-No GUIDANCE, supra note 234.
254. States RCRA Survey, supra note 238, at 2229.
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agency compliance inspections of RCRA hazardous waste facilities and enforcement
actions initiated to address instances of non-compliance fell seriously short of the
mark in fiscal year 1984. Hazardous waste disputes, as distinguished from the
interstate controversy between Illinois and Wisconsin in Milwaukee I and Milwaukee
II, will most probably concern disposal situations that have not been duly permitted.
It would seem more appropriate to characterize the expert administrative agency
action under RCRA as having begun to "address the problem" presented. The Court
in Milwaukee II considered federal common law particularly inappropriate when used
to impose regulatory standards more stringent than those established in permits
actually issued under the FWPCA. However, the Court's opinion does not require
deference to the expert agency when administrative and permitting activities do not
parallel the FWPCA per-plant effluent limitations.
b. SDWA and CERCLA Administration
The EPA administers the "problem" of hazardous waste under SDWA255 and
CERCLA as well. Under each statute the EPA has been taken to court by parties
claiming that the agency violated statutory deadlines. 25 6 The National Wildlife
Federation and the Colorado Wildlife Federation sued EPA in July of 1983, claiming
that the agency was allowing the injection of contaminants into underground drinking
water sources. In addition, the groups claimed that EPA violated the Safe Drinking
Water Act by not meeting statutory deadlines for the implementation of state
underground injection programs.257 Under a settlement agreement, EPA must impose
a regulatory program on states without satisfactory programs to control waste
injection.258
The agency's implementation of CERCLA has also been controversial, with a
history that significantly departs in tenor from the administration of early environ-
mental standards. 259 One of the most prominent examples of EPA heel-dragging
under CERCLA involves the agency's failure to develop natural resource damage
assessment regulations. 26' The regulations were mandated by statute to be pro-
255. Id. A general criticism of the RCRA regulations for hazardous waste management facilities is that the
monitoring requirements may be insufficient to detect environmental contamination. TECHNoLoOiS AND MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSEsSiENT 376 (1983). See Comment,
Federal Water Pollution Laws: A Critical Lack of Enforcement by the Environmental Protection Agency, 20 SAN DiEGO
L. REv. 945 (1983).
256. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Ruckelshaus, No. 83-1333 (D. Colo. filed July 26, 1983); Goldberg v. Clark,
No. 84-1802 (D..D.C. filed June 13, 1984).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1) (1982).
258. 20 ENV'T RE . CAs. (BNA) No. 9 News Notes (Feb. 24, 1984).
259. Khristine L. Hall, attorney and representative of the Environmental Defense Fund, voiced the group's dismay
over EPA envorcement activities:
l1t has become regrettably clear that we are no longer moving forward in protecting public health and the
environment from the mismanagement of hazardous waste.... EPA has followed a course of action which
places emphasis on deregulation and cost savings to industry at the expense of adequate protection of public
health and the environment.
1982 RCRA Hearings, supra note 194, at 179; see also William D. Ruckelshaus, director of the Environmental Protection
Agency, [12 Current Developments] ENVT REP. (BNA) 1046 (Oct. 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Ruckelshaus].
260. CERCLA § 107(a), (c); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1982).
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mulgated two years ago, along with EPA procedure regulations outlining how claims
against the fund should be undertaken. 26' To date, at least three suits have been filed
to compel the EPA administrator to promulgate natural resource damage assessment
regulations.2 62 As of this writing, the proposed rules have not been announced.
The Milwaukee II indicia of control and expertise, as asserted by an administra-
tive agency empowered by a federal legislative scheme to address pollution sources,
are not reflected in the current assessments of hazardous waste regulation. Indeed,
present hazardous waste regulatory programs are more easily likened to the Clean
Water Act programs found wanting in Milwaukee I. To the extent federal and state
expert administrative agencies have failed to impose regulatory standards and issue
and monitor hazardous waste permits, the broad reading of Milwaukee II, as
woodenly applied in both Stepan and Price, is extremely suspect. The Milwaukee II
Court, deferring to stringent effluent limitations and duly issued and enforced EPA
permits,263 noted significantly that "[t]here is thus no question that the problem of
effluent limitations has been thoroughly addressed through the administrative scheme
established by Congress, as contemplated by Congress."2 64 Numerous questions
exist concerning the efficacy and thoroughness of congressional hazardous waste
measures, and little doubt remains that the hazards of toxic pollution are not currently
being addressed "as contemplated by Congress."
3. Alternate Federal Forum
A major concern underlying the recognition of federal common law is the
availability of a forum in which complaining states can protect their interests. 265 The
need for some overriding control to prevent one state from polluting another state, a
concern recognized in the adoption of the Constitution,266 requires that federal
solutions be available to solve pollution conflicts. Milwaukee I established that
federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual states should
vindicate the environmental rights of a state against improper impairment by sources
outside its domain. 267 Additionally, the lenient regulatory approach taken by one
state can inequitably transgress the more stringent pollution standard objectives of
another state.
a. Federal Groundwater Regulation
Transboundary hazardous waste pollution involves the contamination of
groundwater 68 from which Americans receive fifty percent of their drinking
261. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1982).
262. 20 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) No. 25 News Notes (June 22, 1984).
263. 451 U.S. 304, 320-22 (1981).
264. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
265. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104, 107 (1972).
266. See supra note 6.
267. 406 U.S. 91, 107 n.9 (1972).
268. "'[G]round water' means water in a saturated zone or stratum beneath the surface of land or water." 15 U.S.C.
§ 9601(12) (1982).
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water.269 Groundwater sources27° may exist underground in interstate areas, 27 1 so
that leaching27 2 of hazardous waste from landfills273 may deteriorate the water
sources of one or more other states.274
Congress began to address the difficult task of regulating groundwater use and
pollution by delegating responsibility to the states;2 75 current provisions in various
environmental laws affect underground aquifers. 276 However, the acute danger of
groundwater contamination posed by the routine practice of injecting or burying
highly toxic chemical wastes2 77 received direct attention in the SDWA and the
hazardous substances legislation.278 Unfortunately, the Legislature's recognition of
the grave risks associated with inadequate groundwater protection has not translated
into effective regulatory action.
Because SDWA and RCRA overlap, the EPA coordinates its implementation of
the two statutes by regulating aboveground ancillary facilities and activities associ-
ated with injection of hazardous wastes under RCRA, and injection wells under the
SDWA.279 The EPA thus does not require those facilities permitted under the
269. [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 269 (June 17, 1983) (over 100 million Americans depend on
underground drinking water supplies) [hereinafter cited as Noncompliance with RCRA].
270. Groundwater aquifers are also defined as "any underground formation saturated with water." Tripp & Jaffe,
Preventing Groundwater Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 3 n.19 (1979).
271. Underground drinking water sources change across the United States and groundwater contaminants move
about naturally or may be exported to other states. [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 354 (July 1, 1983).
272. Leaching is a process whereby pollutants migrate from the surface of the land or pond where they are placed,
through the subsoil, and then into groundwater. WEBSmR'S 3D NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1282 (unabridged
1976).
273. EPA announced that organic chemicals, many of which are believed to cause cancer and other life-threatening
diseases in humans, have been detected in 45 of the public water systems that draw on groundwater and serve over 10,000
people. The presence of these chemicals in underground sources of drinking water is generally believed to be the result of
improper disposal of hazardous waste. 47 Fed. Reg. 9351 (1982).
274. A problem of pressing national concern involves the rapidly diminishing groundwater supplies throughout the
West. Groundwater supplies are increasingly under pressure from the needs of growing cities, from water-intensive
energy development projects such as power plants and coal-slurry pipelines, and from agriculture.
A district court in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), predicted,
without citation to any authority, that groundwater pollution caused by hazardous waste disposal would cross state lines in
only "rare instance[s]." Id. at 1107. It is probably not insignificant that this conclusion supported the court's
determination that § 7003 of RCRA is not limited in application to groundwater pollution having interstate effects. See id.
275. 33 U.S.C. 33 1288(b)(2)(I)-(K) (1982). Under § 208 of the CWA, the EPA can require states to plan for
groundwater protection, but its authority to regulate groundwater is ambiguous.
276. Other federal statutes include: The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); The
Surface Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982); The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 33
300(0 to 3000)-10 (1982). See Dycus, Development of a National Groundwater Protection Policy, 11 B.C. ENVTL. At'.
L. REV. 211, 257-67 (1984).
277. Cleanup of groundwater is often prohibitively expensive or technologically impossible. While the full nature of
potential groundwater damage is presently unclear, contamination of underground drinking sources by hazardous waste
disposal is described as widespread and the "most serious source" of pollution. Teclaff, Principles for Transboundary
Groundwater Pollution Control, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1065, 1071 (1982).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (1982).
279. Under the Underground Injection Control Program (UIC) of the SDWA, which requires the EPA to prohibit
any underground injection that endangers drinking water, EPA classified wells injecting hazardous waste into two
categories, Class I and Class IV. Class IV wells posed the most serious threat to groundwater because they involved either
direct injection of hazardous waste into a drinking water aquifer or injection into shallow wells above such aquifers. 40
C.F.R. § 144.6 (1983). The EPA recently announced the final rule banning all Class IV wells. 49 Fed. Reg. 20,138,
20,141 (1983).
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Underground Injection Control (UIC) program2 8 to obtain a RCRA permit. If states
are unwilling or unable to implement the UIC program, Congress requires the EPA to
do so; the federal agency's permitting procedure reflects current application
requirements .281 Notwithstanding the progress of UIC permitting procedures, the
EPA has acknowledged that the tests currently required to confirm the presence of
groundwater contamination are inaccurate. The tests are scheduled to be replaced by
less sensitive alternative testing methods. 282 The value of test predictions, however,
will be difficult to gauge. According to a recent GAO report, seventy-eight percent of
hazardous waste facilities are not complying with the federal requirement to monitor
groundwater. 283 Enforcement efforts against violators have been limited,2 84 due in
part to growing manpower and resource shortage problems at the EPA's regional and
state offices. 285 In addition, any land disposal facility that closed or did not receive
hazardous waste after January 26, 1983 (the effective date of the final land disposal
regulations) is not subject to the corrective action or groundwater monitoring
requirements of those regulations. Several EPA regions have documented a sub-
stantial number of facilities and units that have closed or stopped taking wastes after
January 26. If any of these facilities or units cause a release into the environment at
any point in the future, little warning and no remedy will be provided.286
CERCLA will provide limited assistance in the regulation of groundwater. The
Act was designed to clean up releases of hazardous substances rather than to regulate
their disposal. Nevertheless, the Act establishes a regulatory regime with reporting,
cleanup, liability, and enforcement provisions that can be invoked to prevent or stem
hazardous waste facility groundwater pollution.2 87 However, the EPA's record of
accomplishment under the CERCLA cleanup authority reveals mismanagement and
deficiencies far worse than those observed in its administration of the RCRA
provisions. The failure to establish hazardous waste toleration level standards, 288 the
disorganized nature of operations and day-to-day management of agency
functions, 289 and the absence of streamlined procedures to overcome obstacles of
paperwork and red tape have all significantly impeded the EPA's ability to pursue
lawsuits against parties responsible for hazardous waste sites. 290 Also, CERCLA
monies are clearly inadequate to clean up even the priority-status hazardous waste
sites, let alone the 16,000 sites already known to exist. 29' "[A] lack of organization,
280. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h(b)(1), 300h-1, 300h-2 (1982).
281. 49 Fed. Reg. 20,138, 20,143, 20,155 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 124, 144, 146-47).
282. Problems with Test Required for Monitoring Groundwater Prompt EPA to Revise Approach, [14 Current
Developments] ENV'T RE'. (BNA) 1415 (Dec. 9, 1983).
283. See Noncompliance with RCRA, supra note 269.
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 251-52, 254.
286. RCRA Reauthorization, supra note 161, at 45-46.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
288. Ruckelshaus, supra note 259.
289. Noncompliance with RCRA, supra note 269.
290. Id.
291. Ruckelshaus, supra note 259.
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a lack of personnel, and a lack of direction from the top" were identified as major
stumbling blocks in the CERCLA programs.
292
Notwithstanding these criticisms, EPA's Fiscal Year Operating Guidance re-
views policy changes and forecasts a significantly enhanced rate of cleanup during
the rest of fiscal year 1984 and throughout fiscal year 1985.293 However, in the
document the EPA concedes that "it will take many years to substantially eliminate
the nation's abandoned hazardous waste site problem, depending upon the length of
time and level of funding contained in the reauthorization legislation.' 294 Additional-
ly, the CERCLA program reauthorization will be accompanied by a myriad of new
rules and amendments expanding the program, which will slow agency progress in
cleaning up sites.2 95 For example, new and expanded responsibilities will be imposed
on the EPA by the Senate bill reauthorizing RCRA and CERCLA.296
b. The Potential for Interstate Groundwater Controversies
Supplemental state and local regulation of groundwater drinking sources is
generally considered inadequate as well. 297 As noted above, RCRA establishes a
shared regulatory program under which states may take individual regulatory actions
needed to attain the goals of the hazardous waste program as approved by the EPA. 98
However, most state and local governments have not successfully conducted solid
waste management and resource recovery activities.2 9 9 Similarly, the ability of a state
to fulfill its role in implementing the CERCLA program is questionable. The federal
government's contribution to cleanups is limited by statute, 30 0 leaving the bulk of
hazardous waste site cleanup to the states.3 01
292. GAO says 78 Percent of Facilities Sampled Not Complying with Groundwater Monitoring, [14 Current
Developments] ENV'T RaP. (BNA) 976, 977 (Oct. 14, 1983).
293. OPERATINo GUIDANCE, supra note 234, at 2034.
294. Id.
295. Ruckelshaus Moving to Shape Congressional Action on Superfund, Inside E.P.A. weekly Report, June 22,
1984, at 9.
296. See generally Conference Report and Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 161, at HI1,103-11,141.
297. Most states lack comprehensive statutes and regulatory programs specifically designed to protect groundwater.
According to a report on an American Petroleum Institute Study, 16 states have adopted groundwater classification
schemes and 19 states have some form of groundwater quality standards. A.P.I. Presents Overview of State Groundwater
Programs, 5 HAZARDOUS wAsTE REPORT 7 (Jan. 9, 1984).
298. "States may take over and operate all of this machinery if they choose. There are no 'reserved' sources that
must be permitted or otherwise regulated by the federal government, with the limited exception of some sources on Indian
land." Pedersen, supra note 211, at 15,070.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 249-54.
300. Unless an emergency situation that poses an immediate risk to public health, welfare, or the environment arises
and federal action is necessary, or unless the affected state has become a cooperating party, the federal government's
cleanup is limited to expenditures of one million dollars or a duration of six months. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1) (1982).
Remedial actions can be undertaken only after consulting with the affected states and only if the state agrees to assure
all future maintenance of the removal and remedial actions provided, to assure the availability of a hazardous waste
disposal facility for offsite storage or disposal, and to pay 10% of the remedial costs. Id. § 9604(c)(2)--(3).
A party's response to releases of hazardous substances apparently must be in accordance with the requirements of a
National Contingency Plan. Bulk Distribution v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-6805-CIV-JAG, slip. op. (S.D. Fla. June 19,
1984), Hazardous Waste L.R. 5874 (July 2, 1984). Finally, EPA must respect the priority established by the states,
despite the development of a national list of priority waste sites. Pedersen, supra note 211, at 15,083-84.
301. It is expected that the federal government will be able to be directly involved in the cleanup of only 100 to 400
sites, or on the average from two to eight per state. Pedersen, supra note 211, at 15,084.
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Questions of interstate groundwater management that are traditionally delegated
to the courts are assuming greater importance as the drinking water supplies of states
become susceptible to the less regulated hazardous waste disposal practices of
neighboring states.30 z The potential for an increased number of interstate conflicts
stemming from the pollution of underground aquifers is already being realized: in
Stepan,3"3 the court refused the City of Philadelphia's invitation to address the
availability of federal common law as it affected groundwater under the CWA.
Instead, the court held that the interstate groundwater pollution was "but one element
of the damage resulting from [the] illegal disposal" of hazardous waste and that the
City's complaint was premised upon this illegal disposal. 30 4 The Stepan court then
agreed with Justice Brotman's determination in Price30 5 that because of their
comprehensive schemes, RCRA and CERCLA preempted federal common law.
Although reviewing a claim potentially involving interstate pollution, the court in
Stepan failed to comment on the absence of a neutral forum in which out-of-state
parties could seek redress. 306 Neither SDWA, RCRA, nor CERCLA contains a
corollary to section 208 of the CWA, 30 7 which establishes a procedure by which
states can plan on an area-wide basis to regulate pollution.
30 8
The permit-granting processes conducted pursuant to both SDWA and RCRA
did not include the same notice and comment procedure that the Milwaukee IH Court
deemed satisfactory to protect the states' interest in the availability of an impartial
302. In Massachusetts, for example, the regulations on the financial operating responsibility and operating
procedures of hazardous waste treatment facilities are at least as strict as federal rules in some areas, and in the area of
financial responsibility and groundwater monitoring even stricter. [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1162
(Oct. 28, 1983) (Joy Kind, spokesperson for the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering).
303. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
304. Id. at 1147; see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982). The
court in Reilly Tar appears to agree that Milwaukee 11 would require dismissal of a claim alleging interstate groundwater
contamination based on the federal common law of nuisance. Id. at 1107 n.l.
305. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
306. The court resolved the various claims by permitting the City of Philadelphia to preserve its claim for response
costs under CERCLA and its claim for damages based on its state common law of nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and
negligence. 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
307. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1982).
308. In interstate situations, the governors or local officials of the respective states consult and cooperate regarding
the designation of the boundaries of the interstate area and a representative organization to develop the area-wide waste
treatment management plans. Id, § 1288(a)(3). No permit is to be issued for any point that is in conflict with the
management plan. Id. § 1288(e). Despite this feature, § 208 has yet to fulfill its promise. The EPA has delayed issuing
regulations, agency financing for the program has been diverted, and areas that might well be some of the greatest
benefactors of the program, such as interstate metropolitan areas, have not been designated, [ 12 Current Developments
ENv'T REP. (BNA) 612 (Sept. 18, 1981).
RCRA does authorize states to enter into interstate compacts for "cooperative effort and mutual assistance for the
management of ... hazardous waste ... and the enforcement of their respective laws relating thereto." 42 U.S.C. §
6904(b)(1) (1982).
The Milwaukee I1 opinion made no reference to the role of interstate compacts as a substitute for federal common
law. This omission is quite probably the result of the Court's recognition of the unlikelihood that states with conflicting
standards of environmental protection would adopt effective administrative mechanisms, even if timely congressional
approval could be obtained. While interstate compacts could provide states with a legitimate means of attaining equitable
solutions to hazardous waste controversies, this form of joint effort will not provide the necessary forum for redress.
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forum.3 0 9 Indeed, the laws fail to recognize the potential interstate character of
underground waters; RCRA leaves the question of the interstate pollution of aquifers
completely unmentioned. Prompted by the inadequate measures available to protect
groundwater resources, the EPA recently established a new Office of Groundwater
Protection. The new department will promote consistent policies and regulations to
protect groundwater under all the relevant environmental legislation. 310 The latest
draft groundwater protection strategy issued by the EPA predominantly consists of
EPA efforts simply to coordinate existing rules on groundwater protection. 311 The
draft strategy exhorts states to establish an aquifer classification system similar to the
voluntary program outlined in RCRA,3 12 but has been criticized for its failure to
describe how classifications of aquifers and other strategies will be accomplished by
the individual states. 3 13 The draft also does not propose an adequate source of
funding for the states to develop and operate groundwater programs. 314 The states
without groundwater quality programs have objected to the draft strategy, claiming
that funds are not available to draft and implement groundwater strategies of their
own. 315 Also missing from the proposed system of groundwater protecton is a system
supported by the EPA to train staff personnel in the technology of groundwater
science.
31 6
It appears that fifteen to nineteen states have adopted some type of groundwater
quality standards program, 3 17 which vary widely in approach. The diversity in
approaches taken by states controlling groundwater use suggests a potential for
controversies between neighboring states with land situated over a common
aquifer. 3 18 The EPA draft policy does not address the protection of interstate
aquifers, and inconsistent standards arising in areas governed by state activities
309. The notice and comment procedure required by the appeal process is described in 40 C.F.R. § 271.20 (1983):
Prior to submitting an application to EPA for approval of a State program, the State shall issue public notice
circulated in a manner calculated to attract the attention of interested persons including: (i) Publication in enough
of the largest newspapers in the State to attract statewide attention; and (ii) Mailing to persons on the State
agency mailing list and to any other persons whom the agency has reason to believe are interested ...
310. OPERATING GUIDANCE, supra note 234, at 2033.
311. Mike Synar, chairman, House Government Operations Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources, 114 Current Development] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2227-28 (April 13, 1984). Synar released a Congressional
Research Service analysis that he said "showed the current EPA draft strategy to be the weakest of the three drafted since
1980." Id. at 2228. Marian Mlay, director of the EPA's new Office of Groundwater, told the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association that a final groundwater strategy probably would be issued in late May or early June. [ 14 Current
Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2288 (April 27, 1984).
312. Jacqueline Warren, toxics project director, Nat'l Resources Defense Council, Inc., [14 Current Developments]
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2288 (April 27, 1984).
313. David W. Miller, groundwater consultant, Geraghty & Miller, [14 Current Developments] ENVT REP. (BNA)
2257 (April 20, 1984).
314. Under the draft strategy, states would receive money only to develop the programs and the funding would come
from existing state grants. Warren, supra note 312. The budget proposed by the administration for fiscal year 1985 does
not include funds to aid states. Synar, supra note 311, at 2228.
315. Aim, supra note 234.
316. Jay H. Lehr, executive director, National Water Well Association [14 Current Developments] ENv'r REP.
(BNA) 2256 (April 20, 1984).
317. Joan Warren, staff associate, National Governor's Association, [14 Current Developments] ENVT REP. (BNA)
2288 (April 27, 1984). Statutory permit systems have been adopted in most Western States, while fewer than half the
Eastern States have any centralized planning or control of groundwater use. Dycus, supra note 276, at 231.
318. AIm, supra note 234.
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appear likely. 319 Additionally, the final groundwater protection strategy will not
carry the force of regulation and will not require states to adopt more stringent
effective groundwater protection measures than they currently employ. 320 These
"inconsistencies" between varying state approaches to groundwater protection issues
assume critical significance when current federal groundwater protection strategies
are examined. RCRA groundwater monitoring requirements 321 are not likely to
safeguard aquifers affected by RCRA-regulated sites. "Technical complexity and site
specificity make it difficult for government rules to set conditions for effective
groundwater monitoring. "322 The possibility of interstate resource conflicts stem-
ming from the hazardous waste contamination of shared aquifers is thus very real.
The predicament that a state encounters when its groundwater resources are exposed
to the contaminating practices of a neighboring state mirrors the dilemma faced by
Illinois and other "downstream" states. However, groundwater control questions are
distinct from traditional water pollution questions since they are focused on pre-
vention. 323 The huge costs involved in the cleanup of groundwater contamination, as
well as the imperfect and inadequate technologies used to detect and cleanup
contamination, 324 counsel strongly for regulatory controls designed to prevent
groundwater resource degradation.
Milwaukee I and Milwaukee 11 recognized the need for alternative federal forums
in which to resolve disputes of this nature. The Milwaukee II Court found that the
"ample opportunity for a State affected by decisions of a neighboring State's
permit-granting agency to seek redress" sufficed to provide a forum for interstate
water pollution controversies.325 As Justice Blackmun observed in his dissenting
opinion to Milwaukee II:
Since both the Court and Congress fully expected that neighboring States might differ in
their approaches to the regulation of the discharge of pollutants into their navigable
waters, it is odd, to say the least, that federal courts should now be deprived of the
common-law power to effect a reconciliation of these differences. 326
Nevertheless, the majority in Milwaukee II appeared satisfied that a statutory
permit-granting process ensures an impartial forum for the pursuit of claims. The
Court further implied that the existence of an administrative mechanism designed to
319. "In short, there is, with rare exception, no conjunctive management of groundwater quantity and quality by the
states at this time." Dycus, supra note 276, at 232.
320. Mlay, supra note 311, at 2288.
321. 40 C.F.R. § 264.90 -. 100 (1983); see Dycus, supra note 276, at 257-64.
322. Joel S. Hirschhom, senior associate, Office of Technology Assessment, [14 Curent Developments] ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 2228 (April 13, 1984). The effectiveness of one national solution to groundwater contamination is doubted
because sources of contamination and uses and geographical formations of aquifers vary from state to state. But see
Dycus, supra note 276, at 232-33.
323. The Teclaffs highlight this distinction: "There are important differences between surface and ground water
pollution. Groundwaters store pollution and the process is often irreversible, whereas surface flowing waters have some
capability for self-purification." Teclaff & Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends in Treaty
Law, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 77, 80 (1981).
324. Hirsehhom, supra note 322.
325. 451 U.S. 304, 326 (1981).
326. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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accommodate the objections of neighboring states to an agency's permit issuance
reflects congressional intent to supplant the role of federal common law.327
This inference is unavailable in the hazardous waste context. A state's dissent to
the official permitting of a particular hazardous waste facility does not receive the
administrative review approved as a substitute for federal common law in Milwaukee
H. Additionally, permit issuance under RCRA and SDWA will occur slowly. Until
all or most facilities are permitted, a state has no opportunity to object at a statutory,
administrative proceeding to the hazardous waste practices of a sister state. Neither
Price nor Stepan specifically explored the need to entertain interstate challenges in a
neutral forum. This omission renders each court's application of Milwaukee II, and
the conclusion that the federal common law of nuisance is preempted, less au-
thoritative.
IV. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPUTES
Interstate disputes should not be resolved under state law, because the nature of
the controversy makes state law an inappropriate vehicle for control. 328 Groundwater
resource controversies implicate "uniquely federal interests" 329 and present the
strongest case for the application of a federal rule of decision. 330 Traditionally,
federal common law has been developed to protect federal interests in a subject
matter and to provide "an unbiased forum for the resolution of interstate dis-
putes. "331
This Note dissects the comprehensiveness standard and other factors apparently
significant to the preemption question in Milwaukee I. Factors relevant to the
analysis focusing on the absence of preemption also are relevant to the question of
327. Id. at 326. Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent that the majority's conclusion that "the scheme established by
§ 402 'provides aforum for the pursuit' of a neighboring State's claim is not inconsistent with the understanding that other
forums remain available." Id. at 345 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
328. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). Although the Court in Milvaukee 11
did not reach this issue, the state court forum may be completely foreclosed. 451 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1981). The opinion
did address the availability of state law remedies in several oblique passages. Identifying an "inconsistency" in the
argument made by Illinois, the Court noted that "[ilf state law can be applied, there is no need for federal common law; if
federal common law exists, it is because state law cannot be used." Id. at 313 n.7. Resort to state law remedies was
denied in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 11), 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). The Milwaukee III decision, a
ruling on an appeal from the United States Supreme Court's remand of Milwaukee 1 (and on an interlocutory appeal in
related cases), found that federal law precluded the application of state law to determine liability or establish a remedy for
interstate water pollution. The Court identified the issue in interstate resource disputes to be one of "'dividing the pie,'
i.e., the equitable reconciliation of competing uses of an interstate body of water." Id. at 410. The competing uses of
groundwater resources present similar problems of equitable resource allocation.
329. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The Seventh Circuit
appropriately noted that "[t]he claimed pollution of interstate waters is a problem of uniquely federal dimensions requiring
the application of uniform federal standards." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1984).
330. The Supreme Court's equitable apportionment of interstate stream waters demonstrates the development of
"interstate common law." See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). While an action need not be interstate to invoke
federal common law, Collins, supra note 176, at 319, interstate federal common law incorporates both the federal interest
in a rule of decision as well as issues of federalism between the states.
331. Bleiweiss, supra note 75, at 60.
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whether federal common law is needed in hazardous waste cases. Basic federal
interests will be touched when transboundary groundwater contamination occurs.
3 3 2
A uniform federal rule of decision is desirable in hazardous waste disputes, especially
in groundwater contamination controversies. 333 Finally, a variety of loopholes
undermine efforts to enforce the overriding federal interest in environmental protec-
tion and the reform of hazardous waste disposal practices. 334 Milwaukee II does not
require the complete preemption of federal common nuisance law in hazardous waste
litigation. However, this conclusion does not demand ipso facto that federal common
law is an appropriate and needed remedy.335 The Price and Stepan courts could have
avoided their wholesale336 application of Milwaukee 11 by concluding that RCRA and
CERCLA codified the common law of nuisance, thus removing the need for public
nuisance theories in hazardous waste actions. Authority for this position is provided
in a recent decision by the Fourth Circuit interpreting Milwaukee 11:
In that case, the Supreme Court, interpreting the scope and effect of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) amendments of 1972, held that federal courts were not
free to apply nuisance principles in the area of water pollution control when Congress has
occupied the field with a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The Court cautioned that the
judiciary's power to apply common-law principles was not preempted by the FWPCA; it
simply could not coexist with a statutory framework Congress devised to treat the same
problems. 33
7
The opinion in United States v. Waste Industries (Waste 11)338 reversed the
district court's 3 39 conclusion that RCRA and CERCLA preempted the federal
common law of nuisance. 340 The district court (Waste 1) concluded that section 7003
of RCRA, the imminent hazard provision, did not apply to inactive or abandoned
332. Milwaukee 11 can be read to mean that administrative agency permit review procedures and programs provide a
neutral forum sufficient to protect federal interests. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 412-13 n.5 (7th Cir.
1984); see supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
333. Although no comprehensive congressional plan for protection of the nation's groundwater exists, "an
integrated federal strategy to safeguard groundwater supplies from future acts of destruction" is needed. Dycus, supra
note 276, at 267. But see Groundwater Policy State not Federal Responsibility, 5 HAZARDOus WASTE REPORT 3 (Jan. 9,
1984) (A centralized national policy would interfere in state and regional groundwater potection responsibilities.).
334. See supra note 234. The executive director of the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, Rich C. Fortuna,
presented the Council's recommendations concerning hazardous waste treatment and addressed the current regulatory
scheme's weaknesses:
[Lloopholes have been the focus of several studies, most notably the Office of Technology Assessment report
which was issued earlier this year .... Suffice to summarize at this point that more generators and individual
waste streams are exempt than are subject to present regulatory coverage: the hole is literally bigger than the
doughnut.
Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act, H.R. 2867 (Part 2-nnovative Technologies): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy, Environment, and Safety Issues Affecting Small Business of the Comm. on Small Business, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 28 (1983) (prepared statement of Richard C. Fortuna, Executive Director, Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council).
335. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981), suggests that need was not demonstrated. See
supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
336. Collins, supra note 176, at 299.
337. United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984).
338. Id. at 159.
339. United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982); see supra text accompanying note 148.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
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waste disposal sites. 3 4 1 The lower court applied rules of statutory interpretation and
read section 7003 to be solely jurisdictional. 34 2 The district court also determined that
under Milwaukee II RCRA and CERCLA preempted a federal common law of
hazardous wastes. 343 The Waste II court rejected the district court's interpretation of
section 7003 and ruled that Congress intended to establish substantive liability by
expanding the common law under the imminent hazard provision. 344 The court
recognized that section 7003 "is essentially a codification of the common law public
nuisance." 345 The Fourth Circuit also noted that Congress expressly intended section
7003 to close loopholes in environmental protection 346 and loopholes in the act itself
Section 7003 is a congressional mandate that the former common law of nuisance, as
applied to situations in which a risk of harm from solid or hazardous wastes exists, shall
include new terms and concepts which shall be developed in a liberal, not a restrictive,
manner. This ensures that problems that Congress could not have anticipated when
passing the Act will be dealt with in a way minimizing the risk of harm to the environment
and the public. 347
The Waste I court used Milwaukee II to support its decision that RCRA and
CERCLA provide the sole substantive standards in the field of hazardous waste
disposal.3 48 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that:
This, however, misreads the lesson of City of Milwaukee ... [which] disapproved only
of the court's use of federal common law as a source for setting regulatory standards
independent of those established by a comprehensive statutory scheme. The Court did not
assail Congress's prerogative to empower the courts to apply common-law principles as
part of an ongoing regulatory scheme.349
341. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 (E.D.N.C. 1982). The district court concluded that § 7003 was similar to other
statutory sections designed solely to eliminate emergency problems. The court of appeals disagreed, reading the language
of § 7003 to demonstrate that Congress contemplated circumstances when the section's application is not specifically
limited to an "emergency." United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit's
interpretation is that § 7003 follows the holding in United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982). Congress has
specifically rejected the decision in Waste I as "inconsistent with the authority conferred by the section as initially enacted
and with these clarifying amendments.'" Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 161, at HI 1,137; accord, Jones v.
Inmont Corp., 20 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 2001, 2009 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
342. 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1308-09 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
343. Id. at 1315-16.
344. United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984). Two additional courts have determined that
§ 7003 provides only a jurisdictional basis under which citizens may bring suit. See United States v. Solvents Recovery
Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D.
Ind. 1980). The court in United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 12 ENVr'L L. REP. (ENVT'L L. INST.) 20,819 (N.D.
Ohio 1981), has concluded that § 7003 contains both jurisdictional and substantive standards. Other courts presented with
suits brought under § 7003 have applied the imminent hazard provision without resolving whether or not Congress created
a substantive standard in the section. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1110 (D. Minn.
1982); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 788 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 870, 884-85 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
345. 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OFTHE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IsT SEss., REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 31 (Comm.
Print 1979)).
346. Id. at 167.
347. Id. at 166.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
349. Unites States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).
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Congress empowered the courts to apply common-law principles in RCRA's
imminent hazard provision and in section 106(a), 35 ° the imminent hazard provision in
CERCLA. 351 A number of opinions confirm that standards of liability under
CERCLA are governed by federal common law. 352 However, Waste II is the only
decision that addressed the effect of Milwaukee II on federal common nuisance law.
The Waste II opinion did not analyze congressional intent. The court also did not
conclude that RCRA and CERCLA are "comprehensive regulatory schemes" that
displace general common nuisance law. However, it seems clear that the Fourth
Circuit found it unnecessary to analyze these issues. If courts are "empowered" to
apply fully principles of common law under the imminent hazard and liability
provisions of the hazardous waste laws, there is no need to access the federal
common law of nuisance. Thus, if federal common law of nuisance claims are
pleaded alongside claims under RCRA section 7003 or CERCLA section 106(a) or
section 107, a court might ignore or deny the claims on the ground of redundancy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reasoned in Milwaukee I that the federal common law was
available to remedy an environmental nuisance because "the various laws which
Congress had enacted 'touching interstate waters' were 'not necessarily the only
federal remedies available.' 353 Similarly, the laws Congress introduced "touching"
hazardous wastes have not preempted the field of federal common nuisance law.
Specifically, the groundwater protection laws are currently inadequate and the "EPA
is making little progress addressing widespread groundwater contamination prob-
lems." 35
4
This Note has attempted to demonstrate that the hazardous waste regulatory
programs do not provide the sole source of substantive standards of decision in the
field of toxic waste disposal. In Milwaukee II the Supreme Court ruled that the
enactment of a comprehensive regulatory program implied congressional intent to
preempt judge-made environmental law. By applying the factors the Supreme Court
emphasized in its preemption analysis, this Note concludes that the legislative
response to the problems of hazardous waste did not completely preempt federal
common law. Congress expressly preserved common-law remedies to assist
hazardous waste site cleanup efforts, and mandated the application of common law
principles under imminent hazard and liability provisions of CERCLA and RCRA.
Julia A. Davis
350. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
351. This Note does not analyze the contours of the scope of liability under CERCLA §§ 106(a) and 107.
352. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A &
F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. 111. 1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 ENV'T REP. CAs. (BNA) 1905
(C.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. Chem-dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see Hinds, Liability under
Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 H~Av. ENvrL. L. REV. I, 12, 15-19, 32-33 (1982).
353. 451 U.S. 304, 309 (1981) (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101, 103 (1972)).
354. Groundwater Protection Inadequate, Conservation Foundation Reports, 5 HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT 6
(June 25, 1984) (quoting a Conservation Foundation report) "State of the Environment: an Assessment at Mid-Decade")
(emphasis added).





